Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 79 | Issue 1

Article 3

2013

Mis-Concepcion: Why Cognitive Science Proves the
Emperors Have No Robes
John Campbell

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
Recommended Citation
John Campbell, Mis-Concepcion: Why Cognitive Science Proves the Emperors Have No Robes, 79 Brook. L. Rev. (2013).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol79/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

Mis-Concepcion
WHY COGNITIVE SCIENCE PROVES THE
EMPERORS HAVE NO ROBES
John Campbell†
Every judge comes to the bench with personal experiences. If you
assume that your personal experiences define the outcome, you’re going
to be a very poor judge, because you’re not going to convince anybody of
your views . . . . We have to know those moments when our personal
bias is seeping in to our decision-making. If we’re not, then we’re not
being very good judges. We’re not being fair and impartial.1
Justice Sonia Sotomayor
[P]eople make choices for reasons unknown to them and they make
up reasonable-sounding justifications for their choices, all the while
remaining unaware of their actual motives and subsequent
rationalizations.2
Joshua D. Greene

INTRODUCTION
In a blunt article appearing in The New Republic, Judge
Posner criticized Justice Scalia asserting that he is not really a
textual originalist at all, and that instead, he relies on
whatever canon of construction will allow him to support his
conservative views on abortion, states’ rights, guns, and other
issues.3 Indirectly, Judge Posner suggested that Scalia is either
unwilling or incapable of engaging in the personal reflection
†

Lawyering Process Professor – University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
Thanks to Justice Posner for the inspiration that led to this piece—both for his article
and for his comments to me and other attorneys years ago regarding arbitration.
Thanks to Alicia Campbell and Erich Vieth.
1 Interview by Gwen Ifill with Sonia Sotomayor, Supreme Court Justice, on
PBS NEWSHOUR (Feb. 20, 2013), transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
bb/law/jan-june13/justice_02-20.html.
2 Joshua D. Greene, The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul, in 3 MORAL
PSYCHOLOGY: THE NEUROSCIENCE OF MORALITY: EMOTION, DISEASE, AND
DEVELOPMENT 35, 36 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2007).
3 Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, NEW REPUBLIC
(Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/
scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism#.
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that Justice Sotomayor suggests is essential to decision making.4
The title of Judge Posner’s article alone would be enough to raise
eyebrows; Posner titled his work: The Incoherence of Antonin
Scalia.5 For many who have wrestled with some of Scalia’s
decisions—both those he wrote and those in which he joined the
majority—Posner’s words echoed their own criticisms that Scalia
is prone to inaccuracy in his recitation of case law, that his
commitment to textual originalism is questionable, and that in
all, Scalia seems to use his “interpretative principles” to reach
results that fit more with his political and social views than
they do with the law he claims he relies upon.6 These same
assertions are often made more broadly about the conservative
majority of the United States Supreme Court (Justices Scalia,
Thomas, Roberts, Alito, and Kennedy).7
This article asks two questions that grow out of this
discussion. First, is there any evidence that the conservative
majority is actually bending the law to the majority’s common
business-friendly beliefs? And second, if Judge Posner is right, and
it applies to more than Scalia, why and how is this happening? To
get at these questions, this article examines two split decisions in
which the conservative majority won the day: Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds International Corp.,8 and AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion.9 The first opinion was written by Justice Alito10 and
the second by Justice Scalia.11 An analysis of these cases leads to
one conclusion: these opinions are fundamentally, legally unsound.
But this article offers more than a mere conclusion that
the “emperors have no robes.” As the title suggests, the article
employs cognitive science to attempt to explain why the
conservative majority got it so wrong, and, maybe more
importantly, why the conservative majority did not seem to
notice. It addresses how the opinions can cite precedent
extensively if it is indeed true that they are inconsistent with it.
The somewhat surprising conclusion, at least to those who would
Id.
Id.
6 Id.
7 See, e.g., Connor D. Deverell, Note, Defining a Corporation’s “Principal
Place of Business”: The United States Supreme Court Decision in Hertz Corp. v. Friend,
56 LOY. L. REV. 733, 755 (2010); David L. Franklin, What Kind of Business Friendly
Court? Explaining the Chamber of Commerce’s Success at the Roberts Court, 49 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1019, 1056 (2009); A.E. Dick Howard, Out of Infancy: The Roberts Court
at Seven, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 76, 80-82 (2012).
8 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1763 (2010).
9 AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1743 (2011).
10 See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1763.
11 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1743.
4
5
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simply bash the majority, is that it is entirely possible that those
in the majority believe they are being rational, considering both
sides of the argument, and following precedent when in reality
they are being driven by intuition and emotion.12 This is true
because many cognitive errors, some of which are discussed
below, are invisible to those who fall prey to them.
Analyzing the Court’s opinions from a legal standpoint
is doable, but scrutinizing them as to why the majority missed
the mark is more difficult. A powerful tool for rooting this out
lies in cognitive science. It is useful because it provides (1) an
explanation for how beliefs could drive rationalizations,13 and
(2) some hints on how to identify when this is happening.
A growing body of literature regarding decision making
concludes that intuition drives reason. In fact, the emotive
process, which is wrapped up with intuition, often drives our
fundamental beliefs, but because we live in a social world and
because we must defend our beliefs, we construct rationales for
them.14 The result is that humans are prone to provide reasons
for beliefs in a manner that suggests the reasons caused the
beliefs, even though, in truth, the beliefs caused the reasons.15
This article coins a phrase for this phenomenon, calling it
“intuition rationalization” or “IR.”
Cognitive science goes beyond identifying the
phenomenon. It also suggests that highly intelligent people are
especially adept at constructing post hoc justifications for these
intuitive beliefs, making it more likely that others with the same
underlying beliefs can latch onto the purported “justifications.”16
This is a possible explanation for why the majority’s opinions
are at least facially rational and why they can garner
majorities. Finally, cognitive science teaches that when people
engage in intuition rationalization, they genuinely believe that
they are working through the problem; it is not a ruse or a lie,
it is a form of self-talk that leads to self-delusion.17
But, if it is true that IR can and does occur everywhere,
including legal opinions, and if it is equally true that, at least
on its face, it looks like rationality, how can it be identified?
Relying on cognitive science, this article identifies a checklist for
12 JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS
BY POLITICS AND RELIGION 41-47 (2012).
13
14
15
16
17

Id. at 38.
Id. at 39.
See id. at 46.
See id.
See generally id. at 39.

MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED
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some of the most common traits of IR. This list is the first of its
kind to be applied to legal reasoning. These markers prove
useful for testing Posner’s hypothesis that Justice Scalia’s
reasoning is really a malleable act of intuition rationalization,18
and for testing the broader hypothesis that the conservative
majority is engaging in post hoc reasoning to justify opinions
that align with their fundamental goals and beliefs. The
telltale signs of IR include:
•

Strained reasoning – because post hoc reasoning is a
justification, not a driving force for the actual belief, the
justifications offered for the belief are often logically
flawed or inconsistent. This is especially true when the
belief is driven by a response to taboo or deeply held,
but never examined, beliefs;19

•

Confirmation bias – a tendency to cherry-pick facts that
support an already-formed belief;20

•

Substitution – substituting an easy question that can be
answered for more complex, difficult questions;21

•

Creation of “my-side” arguments – the creation of
supporting arguments without a parallel effort or ability
to consider “other-side” arguments.22 Interestingly, the
ability to create longer and longer “my-side” lists
correlates positively with intelligence, but intelligence
does not produce longer “other-side” lists;23

•

Persistence (or stubbornness) – a belief that persists in
the face of counterarguments that should be
persuasive;24 and

• Overconfidence – often displayed by unnecessarily

strong wording, a failure to identify weaknesses, or a
willingness to disregard other opinions or ideas out-ofhand.25

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

See Posner, supra note 3.
See HAIDT, supra note 12 at 39.
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 81 (2011).
See id. at 97-98.
HAIDT, supra note 12 at 80-81.
See id. at 94.
See id. at 69.
KAHNEMAN, supra note 20 at 87.

2013]

MIS-CONCEPCION

111

If the opinions written by Justices Alito and Scalia are a
product of IR, that is, if they are intuition dressed as cold
rationality, then a close examination of the opinions should
reveal some or all of the indicia described above. To this end,
Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion, both handed down within the
last two years, provide ideal specimens for dissection.
These opinions are particularly well-suited for analysis
for several reasons. First, they both produced business-friendly
results, which some allege is a fundamental belief of the
conservative majority.26 Second, the opinions are suitable because
they, at least on their face, announce no fundamental alteration
to existing precedent.27 Instead, they are written as if they are the
inevitable result of the application of immutable principles.
Third, some scholars have already suggested that they are
fundamentally inconsistent with existing law.28 Fourth, the
opinions each include a vigorous dissent. These dissents serve
as both a means for considering how the majority dealt with
potential counter-arguments, and as a check on whether it
omitted information that would have called the conclusions
into question.29 Finally, the opinions fit nicely in my knowledge
base and skill set.30 I briefed, and in some cases argued,
appellate cases dealing with both opinions at a variety of
appellate courts, including the United States Supreme Court.
As a result, I am intimately aware of the precedential value
ascribed to the two selected decisions by those who seek to use
them to insulate businesses from class actions, and I am aware
of the real world results the opinions have produced.
Before going further, I offer a few concessions. First, I
readily concede that IR is not limited to conservative jurists.
26 See Mark Koba, Chamber of Commerce Keeps Scoring With High Court,
CNBC (June 28, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100846493.
27 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); StoltNielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
28 See, e.g., William W. Park, The Politics of Class Action Arbitration:
Jurisdictional Legitimacy and Vindication of Contract Rights, 27 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 837
(2012); Jonathon L. Serafini, Note, The Deception of Concepcion: Saving Unconscionability
after AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 187 (2012–2013).
29 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1756; Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1777.
30 The most obvious example of my involvement in cases that turn on
questions of arbitrability is Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486 (Mo.) cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 191, reh’g denied, 1333 S. Ct. 684 (2012). In that case, I served as
lead counsel representing a putative class of borrowers who received high interest title
loans. The case ultimately led me to argue before the Missouri Court of Appeals once
and the Missouri Supreme Court twice. It also required two separate sets of filing and
review by the United States Supreme Court. The case involved arbitration and
presented the tension between Missouri’s dislike for some class action waivers in
arbitration clauses and the Court’s approval of arbitration.
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Anyone can certainly find intuition dressed as reason in liberal
opinions, and if one digs hard enough, they may find indicia of
IR in this article. The point is not to condemn IR; it is part of
human cognition. Rather, the purpose is to identify IR and to
begin to address its existence. I focus on the conservative
majority because its members purport to engage in pure
reasoning based on where the appropriate legal precedent,
statutory language, and Constitutional provisions lead. I feel
comfortable suggesting that Justice Scalia would adamantly
dispute that he engages in cognitive shortcuts, is driven by his
beliefs rather than by textual analysis, or that his interpretative
principles are really more like loose guidelines. But, as I prove in
this article, IR is deeply embedded in at least the two
conservative majority’s opinions examined in this article. I
contend that identifying this truth is useful for examining
errant decisions and understanding how those decisions went
off the rails. I also contend that until judges recognize that
they, like everyone else, could be subject to IR, they will remain
blind to it. This leads to overconfidence in decisions as
impersonal acts of cold reason, which, as demonstrated in this
article, can lead to fundamentally unsound decisions with
dangerous real world impacts. I leave for others to discuss what
the proper judicial interpretation methods should be; for now, I
am content to assert only that it merits illumination if judges
contend they employ pure reason, but in reality they do not.
The remainder of the article unfolds by first considering
Posner’s critiques, then putting them in the context of principles
of cognitive science. Next, I apply legal analysis and cognitive
science to evaluate the conservative majority opinions in StoltNielsen and Concepcion. I note that this treatment is relatively
detailed. This proved necessary to do justice to the legal
reasoning required to unravel the decisions and to reveal enough
about the decisions to flesh out how IR was at play. Finally, I
offer some takeaways from the analysis and offer some
suggestions for training judges to better consider the role of IR
in their thinking and decisions.
Part I sets out in more detail some of Posner’s critiques.
These are useful because they provide a thoughtful third-party
take on the reasoning of Scalia, considered by many to be the
ringleader of the conservative majority. Because Posner’s article
describes a number of perceived fallacies in Scalia’s reasoning
and then concludes that these are evidence that Scalia is
bending reason to his will, Posner’s article serves as a starting
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point for observing in action some of the telltale logical fallacies
that are the markers of IR.
Part II provides an intellectual underpinning for
Posner’s article by correlating the flaws Posner identified with
cognitive science. The purpose is to familiarize the reader with
common cognitive fallacies and to identify theories on how gutfeelings and moral beliefs drive reasoning. To do this, I rely
heavily on the work of Daniel Kahneman, the author of
Thinking, Fast and Slow,31 and Jonathan Haidt, the author of
The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics
and Religion.32 These works are extraordinary because they are
written in plain English for the non-cognitive science reader
and they draw their conclusions from hundreds of other
studies. As a result, by relying on these two texts, I was able to
learn from the wisdom of dozens of other cognitive and
behavioral scientists, while relying on Kahneman and Haidt to
do the hard work of pulling the studies together.
Part III examines the test cases, and then it identifies
IR within those cases. First, I summarize the holdings of the
two test cases, Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion. Then I put on my
lawyer hat in order to analyze a variety of holdings and subholdings in the cases in light of the substantive law that should
have been applied. I conduct my investigation by treating the
decisions as if they were a law school exam answer. What was
the applicable law? What did the majority say? Does this
analysis hold water? I conclude that the majority often reached
conclusions that were not supported by fact, applied the wrong
law, applied the right law wrongly, or implicitly overruled past
Supreme Court precedent without acknowledging that it did so.
I also note that the decisions produce both illogical and
inequitable results in the real world, adding support to the
conclusion that they are products of IR. After each section in
Part III, I correlate the legal analysis to my identified markers
of IR. In doing so, I establish that the reasoning of the majority
is rife with indicia of IR. The results are discussed, and then
provided in a simple table for reference.
Because I conclude that IR is at play, this suggests that
emotion and intuition are driving the decisions. In Part IV I
venture a suggestion as to what may be driving the conservative
majority. Some basic data regarding how the cases have affected

31
32

See generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 20.
See generally HAIDT, supra note 12.
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filing rates of class actions is considered as well as the views of
some other scholars who have considered the opinions.
Part V briefly discusses the implications of my findings,
suggesting that since IR is at play in the conservative majority’s
decisions, and since IR is a common human condition, it should
be further studied. I pose a list of questions—a research agenda
of sorts—for future authors (including me). I also suggest that
identifying IR explicitly and incorporating cognitive science
lessons into judicial training would be wise.
I.

POSNER’S CRITIQUE OF “THE INCOHERENT ANTONIN
SCALIA”

Posner’s article created a buzz in the legal community.
It isn’t every day that an intellectual heavyweight like Posner,
who is also considered a conservative jurist by many, takes a
swing at a sitting Supreme Court Justice who happens to be
undoubtedly conservative. For this article, Posner’s criticisms
serve as a warm-up. Although he did not relate his conclusions
to cognitive science, they match up nicely with many of the
markers identified herein and help introduce the concepts. For
example, Posner says that Scalia cherry-picks information,
ignores counterarguments, displays internal inconsistencies, and
writes opinions that are overconfident but under-supported.33
Part II will show that these characteristics are predicted by
cognitive science.
Judge Posner’s article was written in response to a book
written by Scalia and the well-known legal writing expert,
Bryan Garner.34 In the book, titled Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts, Scalia and Garner claim to set out
a defense for textual originalism.35 They describe originalists as
those who “look for meaning in the governing text, ascribe to
that text the meaning that it has borne from its inception, and
reject judicial speculation about both the drafters’ extratextually
derived purposes and the desirability of the fair reading’s
anticipated consequences.”36 To this end, they applaud cases
that apply literal meaning, and they somewhat idly speculate
about how to interpret everyday language, such as a sign at the
Posner, supra note 3.
Id.
35 See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012); see also Posner, supra note 3, ascribing the
name “textual originalism” to Scalia and Garner’s work.
36 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 35 at xxvii; see also Posner, supra note 3.
33
34
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entrance to a butcher shop that reads “No dogs, cats, and other
animals allowed.”37 Along the way, they also invoke the name of
well-known Justices who they claim were also originalists, and in
general, they decry the work of the “so-called consequentialis[t],”
who they assert inappropriately engages in the practice of
asking, “is this decision good for the little guy?”38
The book might be considered a tour de force by
conservatives but for the work of Judge Posner. Unfortunately
for Scalia and Garner, Judge Posner chose to read the book as
only he could. He apparently was not impressed. In his critique,
he refutes most of the positions advanced in the book.39
To begin, he points out that although professing to
believe in originalism, Scalia and Garner set out no less than 57
principles of interpretation.40 He documents that many of the
judges who were alleged “originalists” actually relied on common
sense, legislative history, and other resources that should be
anathema to Scalia and Garner.41 And perhaps most interestingly,
he carefully examines the wide range of cases set out by Scalia and
Garner and determines that many of them simply do not say what
Scalia and Garner say they do.42
Posner recounts the moment when he decided to start
putting the authors to their proof.43 He writes:
Scalia and Garner ridicule a decision by the Supreme Court of Kansas
(State ex rel. Miller v. Claiborne) that held that cockfighting did not
violate the state’s law against cruelty to animals. They say that the
court, in defiance of the dictionary, “perversely held that roosters are not
‘animals.’” When I read this, I found it hard to believe that a court would
hold that roosters are not animals, so I looked up the case. I discovered
that the court had not held that roosters are not animals. It was then
that I started reading the other cases cited by Scalia and Garner.44

From this starting point, Posner reviewed several more
cited cases and concluded they were inconsistent with how
Scalia and Garner presented them.45 In some cases he notes
that although Scalia and Garner criticize the decision, it could
37 Posner, supra note 3. A literal reading of this sign could prohibit humans
from entering.
38 Id.
39 Posner, supra note 3. Garner wrote an eloquent comeback to Posner. Bryan
A. Garner, Response to Richard A. Posner, LAW PROSE (Sept. 5, 2012),
http://www.lawprose.org/blog/?p=570. The debate continues.
40 Posner, supra note 3.
41 See id.
42 See id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
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be justified by textual originalism.46 In others, he points out
that Scalia and Garner, to advance their assertions, ignore
other rationales provided by courts.47 In all, Posner suggests,
not too subtly, that Scalia and Garner have not faithfully read
or recited the cases.48
Perhaps emboldened, or annoyed, by this fact, Posner
also turns to the authors’ treatment of other interpretive
theories.49 He calls the authors’ characterization of these theories
“disingenuous.”50 And finally, in a compelling set of paragraphs,
Posner chronicles how Scalia and Garner, in only a few pages in
their books, flip flop between embracing “dynamic” interpretation
to repudiating it, to embracing it again.51
All this leads Posner to a conclusion that reads more
like a rather serious accusation. Posner writes:
A problem that undermines their entire approach is the authors’ lack
of a consistent commitment to textual originalism. They endorse
fifty-seven “canons of construction,” or interpretive principles, and in
their variety and frequent ambiguity these “canons” provide them with
all the room needed to generate the outcome that favors Justice Scalia’s
strongly felt views on such matters as abortion, homosexuality, illegal
immigration, states’ rights, the death penalty, and guns.52

Put plainly, Posner asserts that Scalia’s commitment to
textual originalism is a sham, used to justify results that are in
keeping with Scalia’s political and personal opinions. Posner
concludes his article with a jab:
Justice Scalia has called himself in print a “faint-hearted
originalist.” It seems he means the adjective at least as sincerely as
he means the noun.53

Judge Posner’s article is a powerful critique, and it cries
out for follow-up. But piling on is of no value. Instead, I see in
Posner’s article the seeds of a larger understanding of how Scalia,
the conservative majority, and many other judges can believe they
are employing reason when in reality they are acting as slaves to
their own deeply held beliefs. I use Posner as a jumping-off
point for this work, in no small part because he points out

46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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many of the same IR characteristics identified in the
introduction and described in the following section.54
II.

DECISION MAKING

Two of the most profound books on how we form beliefs
and how we justify them were written in the last two years.55
The first is titled Thinking, Fast and Slow, by Daniel
Kahneman.56 The second, written by Jonathan Haidt, is titled
The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics
and Religion.57 Kahneman’s book focuses largely on decision
making and the many mistakes humans make in forming their
decisions.58 Haidt covers some of the same ground, but his
orientation is different. He examines not only how people make
decisions, but how this relates to reason and peoples’ ability, or
inability, to relate to those who have differing views.59 In the
following paragraphs, the literature of Haidt and Kahneman is
examined. Along the journey, as we come across markers of IR,
they are gathered and noted.
Haidt advances the Social Intuitionist Model, in which
intuitions come first and reasoning is usually produced after a
judgment is made, in order to influence other people.60 He does
not suggest that reason can never influence judgment or
intuition, but he suggests it is rare.61 He proves this a number
of ways, including by interviewing people and asking them
about things they will almost certainly think are morally
wrong, but that they cannot reasonably support.62
I examine findings by authors below in order to identify
IR markers used throughout the rest of this article.
A.

Strained Reasoning

In an especially clever study, Haidt and his colleagues
presented people with scenarios they knew are “disgusting” but in
which it is hard to suggest, at least based on reason, that the

54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id.
HAIDT, supra note 12; KAHNEMAN, supra note 20.
KAHNEMAN, supra note 20.
HAIDT, supra note 12.
See KAHNEMAN, supra note 20.
See HAIDT, supra note 12, at 221-22.
HAIDT, supra note 12, at 55.
Id.
Id. at 42-48.
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people in the stories did something objectively wrong. For
example, in one study, subjects were told a story about Jennifer.63
Jennifer works in a hospital pathology lab. She’s a vegetarian for
moral reasons—she thinks it is wrong to kill animals. But one night
she has to incinerate a fresh human cadaver, and she thinks it’s a
waste to throw away edible flesh. So she cuts off a piece of flesh and
takes it home. Then she cooks it and eats it.64

Only 13% of the people surveyed said that what
Jennifer did was acceptable.65
In another study, people were presented with a brother
and sister pair traveling together in France.66 The two were alone
in a cabin one night and decided to have sex.67 They told no one,
they were safe, and they agreed to never do it again.68
Only 20% of the survey participants deemed the behavior
of the brother and the sister appropriate.69 But, Haidt reports that
people struggled with providing reasons.70 When people did
provide reasons, they were often strained.71 For instance,
regarding the brother and sister, a study subject argued that
children from incest were more likely to be deformed. When the
experimenter pointed out that birth control and condoms were
used, the subject strained to answer why incest was still
wrong.72 The same subject wondered aloud if the brother or
sister were too young (apparently considering statutory rape),
then recognized they weren’t, and seemed disappointed.73 When
pushed for another reason, the subject said, “I mean, there’s
just no way I could change my mind but I just don’t know how
to – how to show what I’m feeling, what I feel about it.”74
Haidt illustrates the paradox of intuition driving
reasoning by discussing the rider and the elephant.75 In this
metaphor, the elephant is our intuition, and the rider is
reason.76 Haidt points out that the elephant has been developed

63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id. at 45.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 45.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 45-46.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 46-47.
Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
Id. at 53.
Id.
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over hundreds of millions of years of evolution.77 It is very good
at doing most things.78 However, it is not all that good at being
steered by reason.79 Haidt suggests that although the rider can
sometimes help the elephant anticipate problems or make
decisions that are better in the long term, all too often, the
rider is used to “fabricat[e] post hoc explanations for whatever
the elephant . . . wants to do next.”80
Haidt’s work draws from the findings of others to support
his conclusion. For example, in The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul,
Joshua Greene of Princeton relies upon neuroscience to
demonstrate that people make decisions through emotional
processing, not careful reasoning.81 In his experiments, Greene
presented people with the opportunity to prevent harm to a group
of people by causing harm to another, single person.82 Many of his
experiments were variations of the “trolley dilemma.” In the
trolley dilemma, subjects are asked whether or not they would
push one person off a bridge and onto a track in front of a
trolley if it were the only way to stop the trolley from running
off the track and killing five people.83 Testing this and other
variations, Greene learned through MRIs that with few
exceptions, the regions of the brain related to emotional
processing showed greater activity, activating almost
immediately.84 The author concluded that “across the various
stories, the relative strength of these emotional reactions
predicted the final moral judgment.”85
Greene further established the role of emotional
processing by altering the design so that the subject could, instead
of shoving someone onto the tracks, simply flip a switch that
would divert the trolley onto a safer track, but would eventually
terminate at a spot where one person was on the track, thereby
killing them.86 Greene found that people were more willing to
flip the switch than they were to shove a person off a bridge.87
This is presumably because flipping a switch triggered a far
less intense initial, emotional response.88 This clarified that
77
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emotion—such as an aversion to directly shoving another to her
death—drove decision making. A purely rational mind would
conclude that whether you shove a person onto the track or flip a
switch, the result is the same.89 One life is lost in order to save
five. But that is not what the study revealed, suggesting that
emotion plays a powerful role in decision making.90
Perhaps most interestingly, when Greene talked to the
subjects, they did not relate their decisions to intuition or
emotion.91 Instead, they sought to provide rational justifications
for their decisions.92 Of course, these justifications were often
strained, as they were not the real reason for the belief. Again,
strained reasoning is one of the markers of IR.
Greene summarized these studies:
We have strong feelings that tell us in clear and certain terms that
some things simply cannot be done and that other things simply
must be done. But it’s not obvious how to make sense of these
feelings, and so we . . . make up a rationally appealing story.93

These findings paint a picture. Subjects react
emotionally, especially to things they find taboo or disgusting.
Then, they use reason to justify their initial response. The point
is not that people could never think of a reason why eating
human flesh or incest is wrong. As a lawyer, one may
immediately think of laws against desecrating bodies, the tort of
conversion, statutory rape, etc. The point is that the initial
reaction as to whether what was done was wrong or right was
not intellectual. It was intuition.94 Only after the belief was
formed did the intellect kick in to justify the emotional
response. Or as Haidt explains, “[t]he intuition launched the
reasoning, but the intuition did not depend on the success or
failure of the reasoning.”95
B.

Persistence

Building on his conviction that decision making is
rooted in emotive processing and intuition, Haidt turns again
Id.
Id.
91 Id. at 76-79.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 78.
94 I’m careful here to use “intuition” and not emotional. As Haidt later
explains, “moral judgment is a cognitive process, as are all forms of judgment. The
crucial distinction is really between two different kinds of cognition: intuition and
reasoning.” Id. at 53.
95 Id. at 51.
89
90

2013]

MIS-CONCEPCION

121

to cognitive science to prove the next reasonable inference: if
the mind is not driven by reason, then carefully articulated
arguments probably will not change people’s minds.96 This
provides us with another of the fundamental markers of intuitionbased decision making: persistence.97 A decision that is formed
through IR is rarely altered through counterarguments.98 Even
when study subjects were not to respond immediately, but were
instead given two minutes to consider their decision and
reasoning, most participants went with their original
conclusion, and often had thought of stronger support
arguments.99
C.

My-Side Arguments

Haidt identifies yet another related marker. He
recounts an experiment in which subjects were asked to think of
a social issue, such as whether schools should receive more
funding.100 The people were asked to write down their initial
judgment and then to write down all the arguments for and
against their position.101 These “my-side” and “other-side”
arguments were then counted. Unsurprisingly, people came up
with far more “my-side” arguments than “other-side”
arguments.102 Perhaps even more importantly, the higher the IQ
of the participant, the more “my-side” arguments they created.103
Significantly, however, IQ did not improve one’s ability to think
of “other-side” arguments.104 And here we find another marker
of IR: creation of my-side arguments.105 The study suggests that
intuition-based decision making might include a significant
number of supporting arguments, but it will probably do a poor
job of fairly considering “other-side” arguments and dealing
with them.106
Haidt is not alone in suggesting that most of our
decision making is intuitive rather than calculative. In
Thinking, Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman reaches similar
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conclusions.107 Kahneman illustrates the separation in the mind
between snap-judgments and reason by talking about System 1
(intuition) and System 2 (complex reasoning).108 He provides
examples of what each system does.109 System 1 work includes:
detecting hostility in a voice, determining which object is closer,
answering the question, “What is 2+2,” and driving a car on an
empty road.110 “System 2 engages in things like searching the
memory to identify a surprising sound, comparing two washing
machines for overall value, or checking the validity of a complex
logical argument.”111 Kahneman asserts, based on extensive
research, that engaging System 2 requires serious work.112 In one
simple example, Kahneman suggests an experiment anyone can
try. He says that the next time you are walking with a friend, ask
that friend to multiply 17 x 24 in her head.113 Your friend will
almost certainly stop in her tracks.114 People do this because we
struggle to use System 1 while engaging System 2.115
But, why does it matter that System 2 requires work? It
matters because Kahneman’s research and study suggests that
we will not use System 2 any more than we have to because we
prefer “cognitive ease.”116 We are perfectly content to rely on
intuition (System 1) in many cases. He suggests a new term—the
“law of least effort.”117 This “law” states that people typically take
the path of least resistance in solving problems.118 He concludes
that in order for us to manage the thousands of decisions that we
face every day, we rely heavily on heuristics.119 Throughout the
rest of his book, he proves that this “laziness” and reliance on our
intuition, although effective in many ordinary situations, means
that in other settings we make decisions in irrational ways that
lead to irrational results.120 From Kahneman’s work, we are
able to identify several more markers of IR.
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Confirmation Bias

Kahneman suggests that one of the most pervasive
cognition errors is the “confirmation bias.”121 Kahneman
explains that the confirmation bias is a “deliberate search for
confirming evidence . . . .”122 He writes that “contrary to the
rules of philosophers of science, who advise testing hypotheses
by trying to refute them, people (and scientists, quite often)
seek data that are likely to be compatible with the beliefs they
currently hold.”123
Kahneman also chronicles a phenomenon he calls, What
You See Is All There Is, or WYSIATI.124 He describes this as the
mind’s willingness, even preference, to focus on the information
readily available without reference to what is missing.125 For
example, the leader of a non-profit organization might search
for an event planner in the hopes of putting on a lecture
series.126 The planner’s references are good, and at the meeting
with the planner, the planner is prepared and smart. The planner
points out that her last three non-profit events have led to
significant fundraising. Based on this information, the leader
selects the event planner. But, think what the leader may not
have considered. How does the event planner’s price compare to
what other event planners charge? Are there other event planners
with more experience? Were the past fundraisers that the event
planner mentioned successful because of the event planner, or
were the charities well-established with a plethora of wealthy
donors? Considering what the event planner and event will cost,
what else could the non-profit do to raise funds for the same or
less money? These are all valid questions, but they were not in
the field of mental vision of the leader. Instead, the non-profit
leader made a decision that felt like it was fully informed,
based only on what was seen.127 The non-profit leader, in
selecting the event planner, engaged in WYSIATI.128
Because WYSIATI is the other-side of the confirmation bias
coin, in this article, I use the term confirmation bias to describe
both. In other words, I treat the confirmation bias as both the
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desire to find confirming information and the willingness to ignore
other information, or more importantly, gaps in information.
E.

Substitution

Kahneman identifies another intriguing indicator of IR.
He suggests that when System 1 is being relied upon instead of
the careful thinking of System 2, individuals tend to engage in
substitution.129 Specifically, when individuals are asked to answer
difficult questions that would require lengthy deliberation, they
often simply substitute a simpler question and answer it.130
Kahneman suggests this substitution is invisible to the person
who does it.131
For example, Susan is asked if Candidate Davis would
make a good president. This requires detailed analysis. To
answer this question, Susan needs to know the detailed history
of Candidate Davis, she needs to know and understand the
problems facing the country, she needs to know Candidate
Davis’s proposed solutions to those problems, and many other
facts. Then she needs to consider all the information together.
This could take months of thinking. What Susan might do
instead is substitute the question. For example, she may ask, “Is
Davis a Democrat?” If he is, and Susan is too, she may decide
he’d make a good president. Or she might ask, “Is Davis a nice
guy,” or as some studies suggest, “Is Davis good looking?” This
substitution of one question for another is seamless, and it
creates cognitive ease. As Kahneman explains, “the target
question is the assessment you intend to produce. The heuristic
question is the simpler question that you answer instead.”132
Finally, although not a definitive marker of IR,
Kahneman provides a predictor of when heuristics in general
are especially likely to be deployed in place of System 2
reasoning. He suggests that “[t]he dominance of conclusions over
arguments is most pronounced where emotions are involved.”133
Although this is not a marker in and of itself, it does suggest IR
might be marked by an overall tone, or perhaps more subtle
signs, of emotion. It also suggests that Posner might be right: if IR
is most likely to arise in conjunction with emotion, topics like
abortion, homosexuality, and gun control could certainly trigger it.
129
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With these principles in mind and with our markers
identified, Part III engages in a legally rigorous analysis of the
conservative majority’s conclusions.
III.

ANALYZING THE CONSERVATIVE MAJORITY

In this part I examine the conservative majority’s
conclusions and reasoning in Stolt and Concepcion. First, I
analyze the decisions from a legal perspective. Following the
analysis, I note and discuss the markers of IR. The analysis
begins with two substantive areas of law that play a significant
role in the cases: the standard of review for arbitration decisions
and preemption. These are particularly fruitful because they are
fully developed and established bodies of law. For each, I discuss
the applicable law, explain the majority’s opinion, and then
scrutinize the majority’s decision under existing law. This
discussion serves as a medium for identifying IR markers. I then
turn to other aspects of the decisions. Specifically, the majority’s
factual and legal assertions about class arbitration are
considered. Relying on my own reasoning and drawing from the
dissents’ arguments, I analyze the majority’s justification, again
with an eye out for IR’s fingerprints. Finally, I examine the
majority’s opinions to determine if they are consistent with
past precedent.134
A.

Overview of Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion

This section provides a general summary of StoltNielsen and Concepcion. The summary is not meant to be
comprehensive. Rather, more specific parts of the holdings are
included as appropriate through the remaining analytical
sections. The purpose of this section is only to familiarize the
reader with the basic facts and holdings.
1. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.
Stolt-Nielsen was written by Justice Alito.135 It was a 5-3
decision.136 Justice Ginsburg wrote a vigorous dissent that was

134 I considered organizing by case instead of by topic. However, because the
cases relate to one another and have significant topical overlap, it was more efficient to
organize in that way.
135 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1763 (2010).
136 Id. at 1763.
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joined by Justices Breyer and Stevens.137 The essential facts
and legal holdings follow.
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. (Stolt) served much “of the world
market
for
parcel
tankers—seagoing
vessels
with
compartments that are separately chartered to customers,” such
as respondent (AnimalFeeds), who “wish[] to ship liquids in small
quantities.”138 “AnimalFeeds ship[ped] its goods pursuant to a
standard contract known in the maritime trade as a charter
party.”139 The charter party that AnimalFeeds used contained an
arbitration clause.140 AnimalFeeds brought a class action
antitrust suit against Stolt for price fixing, and that suit was
consolidated with similar suits brought by other charterers.141
After a court ruling on arbitrability, the parties agreed that they
“must arbitrate their antitrust dispute.”142 AnimalFeeds sought
arbitration on behalf of a class of purchasers of parcel tanker
transportation services.143 The parties agreed to submit the
question whether their arbitration agreement allowed for class
arbitration to a panel of arbitrators bound by class rules developed
by the American Arbitration Association following Green Tree
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).144
One of the Class Arbitration Rules at AAA required an
arbitrator to determine whether the arbitration clause permitted
class arbitration.145 The parties selected an arbitration panel,
designated New York City as the arbitration site, and stipulated
that their arbitration clause was “silent” on the class arbitration
issue.146 The panel determined that the arbitration clause
allowed for class arbitration.147 AnimalFeeds filed for the court
to vacate the arbitrators’ award.148
The district court vacated the award.149 It concluded
that the arbitrators’ award was made in “manifest disregard” of
the law, asserting that had the arbitrators conducted a choice-oflaw analysis, they would have applied the rule of federal
maritime law requiring “contracts be interpreted in light of
137
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139
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custom and usage.”150 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that
“because petitioners had cited no authority applying a federal
maritime rule of custom and usage against class arbitration, the
arbitrators’ decision was not in manifest disregard of federal
maritime law”; and that the arbitrators had not “manifestly
disregarded New York law,” which had no established rule
against class arbitration.151
The conservative majority held that imposing class
arbitration on parties who have not explicitly agreed to
authorize class arbitration is inconsistent with the Federal
Arbitration Act.152 Justice Alito wrote that the arbitration panel
“exceeded its powers” by imposing its own policy choice “instead
of identifying and applying a rule of decision derived from the
FAA or [from] maritime or New York law.”153 He asserted that
the arbitration panel rested its decision on AnimalFeeds’s public
policy argument for permitting class arbitration under the
charter party’s arbitration clause instead of determining
“whether the FAA, maritime, or New York law contain[ed] a
‘default rule’ permitting an arbitration clause to allow class
arbitration absent express consent.”154
The majority acknowledged that under FAA § 10(b), it
could direct a rehearing by the arbitrators on the issue, but it
concluded that since there could be only one possible outcome
based on the facts, there was no need to direct a rehearing by
the arbitrators.155
2. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
Here, the majority opinion was written by Justice
Scalia.156 Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence and joined in the
majority’s decision.157 Justice Breyer wrote the dissent.158 The
decision was 5-4.159
The cellular telephone contract between the Concepcions
and AT&T “provided for arbitration of all disputes,” but did not
permit classwide arbitration.160 After the Concepcions were
150
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charged sales tax on the retail value of phones provided free
under their service contract, they sued AT&T in a California
federal district court.161 Their suit was consolidated with a class
action alleging that AT&T “engaged in false advertising and
fraud by charging sales tax” on “free” phones.162 The district
court denied AT&T’s motion to compel arbitration. “[R]elying
on the California Supreme Court’s [Discover Bank] decision,”163
it found the arbitration provision unconscionable because it
disallowed classwide proceedings.164 The Ninth Circuit agreed
that the provision was unconscionable under California law
and held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which makes
arbitration agreements “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract,” did not preempt its ruling.165
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, which reversed
in full. The majority concluded that because the Discover Bank
rule “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress . . . [it] is preempted by the FAA.”166
B.

Reviewing an Arbitrator’s Decision – Standard of Review

In this section, the majority’s opinion in Stolt is
analyzed with an eye toward the standard of review. In Stolt, the
majority concluded that the arbitrators exceeded their authority
in reaching their conclusion.167 The dissent criticized the majority
for applying what the dissent characterized as a de novo review.168
The dissent also pointed out that the Court reviewed the
arbitrators’ decision despite the fact that it was not a final
judgment.169 This section examines whether the majority
deferred to the arbitrators as the law required, or if it instead
sat as the arbitrator, engaging in the de novo review the
dissent suggested.170

Id.
Id.
163 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005),
abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, (2011).
164 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 (citing Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113
P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005)).
165 Id.
166 Id. at 1753.
167 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1762 (2010).
168 Id. at 1777 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
169 Id. at 1778.
170 Id. at 1777.
161
162
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1. The Law Relating to Review of an Arbitrator’s
Decision
The most detailed description of how courts typically
reviewed the award of an arbitrator prior to Stolt is, ironically,
found in the Second Circuit decision handed down in Stolt that
was ultimately reversed. The Second Circuit details that at law
there were two paths recognized to overturn an arbitrator’s
decision.171 The first set of reasons to overturn an arbitrator’s
decision was rooted in Section 10 of the FAA.172 That section
provides:
(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for
the district wherein the award was made may make an order
vacating the award upon the application of any party to the
arbitration—
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the
arbitrators, or either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced[.]173

Courts have also recognized that an arbitrator’s award
can be vacated if the arbitrator demonstrates a “manifest
disregard for the law or exceeds his authority.”174 “Arbitrators
exceed their powers when . . . they issue an award that is
completely irrational.”175 Either way, both standards required
extreme deference to the arbitrator.
In fact, prior to the final decision in Stolt, the idea of
overturning an arbitrator’s decision was somewhat novel. For
example, the Second Circuit in Stolt summarized the law
regarding the review of an arbitrator’s decision as follows:
The party seeking to vacate an award on the basis of the arbitrator’s
alleged “manifest disregard” of the law bears a heavy burden. Our
review under the [judicially constructed] doctrine of manifest
171 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 90-91 (2d Cir.
2008), rev’d and remanded, 559 U.S. 662, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
172 Id. at 90-91.
173 9 U.S.C. § 10 (a)(1-3) (2012).
174 See, e.g., GMS Group, LLC v. Benderson, 326 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 2003).
175 Bosack v. Soward, 586 F.3d 1096, 1104 (9th Cir. 2009).
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disregard is severely limited. It is highly deferential to the arbitral
award and obtaining judicial relief for arbitrators’ manifest
disregard of the law is rare. The manifest disregard doctrine allows a
reviewing court to vacate an arbitral award only in those exceedingly
rare instances where some egregious impropriety on the part of the
arbitrators is apparent.176

The Second Circuit cited to other courts that suggested
even more extreme deference to arbitrators. For example, the
Seventh Circuit held:
It is tempting to think that courts are engaged in judicial review of
arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act, but they are
not. When parties agree to arbitrate their disputes they opt out of
the court system, and when one of them challenges the resulting
arbitration award he perforce does so not on the ground that the
arbitrators made a mistake but that they violated the agreement to
arbitrate, as by corruption, evident partiality, exceeding their
powers, etc.—conduct to which the parties did not consent when they
included an arbitration clause in their contract. That is why in the
typical arbitration, . . . the issue for the court is not whether
the contract interpretation is incorrect or even wacky but whether
the arbitrators had failed to interpret the contract at all, for only
then were they exceeding the authority granted to them by
the contract’s arbitration clause.177

After reviewing the law, the Second Circuit landed on a
deferential standard, holding that there need only be “a barely
colorable justification for the outcome reached.”178
This standard was not new, and had previously proved
to be an almost insurmountable hurdle for those who sought to
overturn an arbitrator’s decision. For example, in a previous
opinion, the Second Circuit stated that since 1960 it considered
arbitral awards in 48 cases, and vacated all or part of the
award in only four.179
The extreme deference shown to arbitrators should be
anything but surprising to those who practice in the field. It is
widely acknowledged by those who handle arbitrations that if a
client loses in arbitration, the case is all but over.180 Courts
generally do not second-guess arbitrators even when the
176 Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 91-92 (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
177 Wise v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, 450 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir.) (citations
omitted), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1047 (2006).
178 Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 92.
179 Duferco Int’l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F.3d 383, 389
(2d Cir. 2003).
180 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012) details when arbitration can be overturned and it is
typically only in cases of severe wrongdoing.
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arbitrator’s decision is truly mindboggling. Instead, arbitration’s
very efficiency has often been attributed to streamlined
procedures and the fact that there is essentially no court
review.181 Or as the Second Circuit articulated the rationale prior
to Stolt, “[t]o interfere with [the arbitral] process would frustrate
the intent of the parties, and thwart the usefulness of arbitration,
making it the commencement, not the end, of litigation.”182
It was based on this law that the Second Circuit held
that the arbitration panel’s decision to allow class arbitration
in Stolt was appropriate.183 The court reasoned that although
there may be arguments against the interpretation given by
the arbitration panel, it was certainly at least “colorable” and
therefore passed muster.184
2. The Majority’s Opinion Reviewing the Arbitration
Panel’s Decision
The majority opinion reversed the Second Circuit outright,
and then concluded that although the Court certainly could send
the case back to the arbitrators with guidance to apply the proper
standard, there was no need because “there [was] only one
possible outcome” under the facts.185
Justice Alito began the majority analysis by explaining
the general standard of review.
It is not enough for petitioners to show that the panel committed an
error—or even a serious error. It is only when an arbitrator strays
from interpretation and application of the agreement and effectively
dispenses his own brand of industrial justice that his decision may
be unenforceable. In that situation, an arbitration decision may be
vacated under § 10(a)(4) of the FAA on the ground that the
arbitrator exceeded his powers, for the task of an arbitrator is to
interpret and enforce a contract, not to make public policy.186

It is worth noting here that the Court did not mention
manifest disregard at all. Instead, the Court addressed manifest
disregard only in a footnote, suggesting that it did not decide
whether the standard of review survived, but then asserting
181 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
648-49 n.14 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Indeed, it is the informality of arbitral
procedure that enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious
means for dispute resolution.”).
182 Duferco Int’l Steel Trading, 333 F.3d at 389 (internal quotation marks omitted).
183 Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 99.
184 Id.
185 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1770 (2010).
186 Id. at 1767 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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that if it did survive, the test was met.187 It characterized the
manifest disregard test, based on AnimalFeeds’s brief, as
requiring a showing that the arbitrators “knew of the relevant
[legal] principle, appreciated that this principle controlled the
outcome of the disputed issue, and nonetheless willfully flouted
the governing law by refusing to apply it.”188 As such, in reversing
the arbitration panel, the Court held that the arbitration panel
“willfully flouted the governing law by refusing to apply it.”189
It did so by concluding that the panel rested its decision
on a “public policy” argument, thereby exceeding its authority.190
The Court stated that the arbitrators’ job was to look into the
appropriate law to apply, but that it made no such undertaking.191
The Court chastised the arbitrators for reading Green Tree
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle192 as allowing for class arbitration
and suggested that the arbitrators never looked at the FAA,
maritime law, or New York law.193
To reach its result, the Court noted that state law did not
apply.194 This was a necessary move by the majority because state
law might have allowed class arbitration (which allegedly would
have violated the spirit of the FAA).195 With state law put aside, the
majority held that no party could be coerced into class arbitration
and found that the parties did not agree to class arbitration.196
3. Analyzing the Conservative Majority’s Reasoning
A close look at the majority opinion reveals it to be
fundamentally flawed. As the dissent points out, it fails in at least
three significant ways. First, it is essentially de novo review.197
Second, the majority engaged in the review of an arbitral decision
that was not a final judgment because the arbitrator had not even
considered a motion for class certification yet, much less made
any decisions on the merits.198 And third, rather than remanding
the case to the arbitrator to decide the issue (even if one agrees
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the Court was right to vacate), the Court inserted its judgment,
something the parties never agreed to.199
The dissent also provides information that suggests that
Justice Alito may have cherry-picked facts to support his
argument. Indeed, the dissent points out that although the
majority claims the arbitrators’ decision rested on “policy,” the
word policy is “not so much as mentioned” in the arbitrators’
award.200 What is mentioned, in direct contradiction to Justice
Alito’s fundamental reason for reversing the arbitration panel, is
an explicit consideration of New York and maritime law.201
Specifically, the dissent points out that far from ignoring these
sources of law, the arbitration panel wrote that “[c]oncentrating
on the wording of the arbitration clause . . . is consistent with
New York law as articulated by the [New York] Court of
Appeals . . . and with federal maritime law.”202
Under the deferential review required, these facts alone
should have ended the inquiry. The decision by the panel cannot
be called wacky, and it certainly did not intentionally disregard
the law. Instead, the contract interpretation decision appears
reasonable. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to dive
into the contract analysis fully, it is black letter contract law
that ambiguous terms (such as “arbitration”) can be and are
interpreted by decision makers.203 There is nothing improper
about that. This fact, combined with even a common sense
consideration of the case, suggests that there was at least a
“colorable justification” for reading the arbitration clause to
allow for class arbitration.
After all, the parties were sophisticated entities. They had
to know about class arbitration, and they should have known that
only a few years earlier the United States Supreme Court
suggested that class arbitration could be appropriate.204 In
addition, the parties agreed to have their disputes resolved under
the AAA Class Arbitration Rules. The willingness by Stolt to have
the claim resolved in such a forum, and the stipulation that the
clause was “silent” as to class arbitration—as opposed to
prohibiting it—meant that the arbitrator certainly could have
concluded that when the parties referred to “arbitration,” they
Id. at 1782.
Id. at 1780.
201 Id. at 1768-69 (majority opinion).
202 Id. at 1781 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 49a).
203 In fact, if the term is ambiguous, common law generally requires that the
term be construed against the drafter. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,
514 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1995).
204 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 451-52 (2003).
199
200
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were referring to all arbitration, not just individual arbitration.
This was supported all the more by the fact that the arbitration
clause’s language was broad, covering “any dispute arising from
the making, performance or termination of this Charter Party.”205
As such, if the question the United States Supreme Court
considered in Stolt was whether there was a “colorable
justification” for the arbitration panel’s decision, then the panel’s
express reference to appropriate facts and applicable law coupled
with the common sense conclusion that the word “arbitration”
might include all forms of arbitration should have been enough
to affirm the decision.
Affirming the Second Circuit should have been routine.
This would have been in step with the purpose of arbitration—to
avoid extensive judicial entanglement.206 Yet, here, after agreeing
to let the arbitrator decide what the term “arbitration” meant, the
majority allowed Stolt to back out of the deal, go to court, and
obtain a de novo review.207
To make sure the arbitration panel did not get any more
ideas about making Stolt engage in class arbitration, the
majority reversed in full rather than allowing the arbitration
panel to consider the applicable law.208 These errors are hard to
justify. If the Stolt case were a law school exam, it likely would
have been considered by the professor administering it as one
of the easier questions. But the majority got it wrong.
4. Indicia of IR Are Present Throughout the Court’s
Reasoning
This section builds upon the analysis above by looking for
indicia of IR. All six indicia noted in the introduction are found.
a. Confirmation Bias
The majority opinion is rife with examples of confirmation
bias. As noted, the majority cherry-picked information about the
dangers of class arbitration but failed to note the benefits.209 This
included ignoring the potential efficiencies of class arbitration and
ignoring the fact that many businesses view arbitration in
205 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1781 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
206 Id. at 1773.
207 See generally id.
208 Id. at 1777.
209 Id. at 1775.
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general as an efficient way to resolve significant disputes.
Similarly, the majority ignores the fact that the parties stipulated
to the class rules of AAA even though this suggests the parties
knew that arbitration could include class arbitration.210 And
finally, the Court chose small quotes from the arbitration panel
to suggest that “policy” drove decision making, but failed to
include portions of the award that suggested the panel
considered the proper law.211
b. Substitution
The majority’s analysis also provides one of the clearest
examples of substitution. In Stolt, the majority was supposed to
be deciding whether the arbitration panel completely
disregarded the facts and the law in reaching its conclusion.212
The majority was supposed to consider the fact that even if the
arbitrator got it wrong, that isn’t enough to reverse.213 In fact, the
Court should have recognized that even if the arbitrators’ decision
was only “colorable,” it was enough to withstand scrutiny.214
However, after a quick recitation of these rules, the
majority never mentioned them again.215 Instead, as the dissent
suggests, the majority engaged in what was really a de novo
review.216 This facilitated cognitive ease because it let the
majority substitute an easy question for the much more difficult
questions described above.217 Specifically, it let the majority ask,
“Do we agree with the arbitration panel?” The answer was “no,”
and so the majority vacated the arbitrators’ award. In keeping
with the way substitution typically works,218 the majority did
not acknowledge the switch. Instead, it plugged in the answer
to the easy question as if it were the answer to a series of far
more difficult ones.

Id. at 1765.
Id. at 1767-68.
212 See id. at 1766.
213 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2008),
rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
214 Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 92.
215 Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1766-67.
216 Id. at 1777.
217 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 20, at 97-98.
218 Id.
210
211
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c. Creation of My-Side Arguments
As discussed, the majority built an impressive list of
things the arbitration panel did wrong.219 However, the majority
was unable to recognize the many things that the arbitration
panel seemed to do right, such as considering maritime law and
New York law, and engaging in a fair recitation of the facts and
an application of general contractual principles regarding the
interpretation of ambiguous terms. Given the appropriate
standard of review, which required the majority to affirm if the
arbitrator made a good faith effort to consider the law and the
facts, the inability to list and consider “other-side”220 arguments
led the majority to the wrong decision.
d. Strained Reasoning
Strained reasoning is the hardest indicia of IR to define
precisely, but as the Supreme Court once famously wrote, “I
know it when I see it.”221 At a minimum, strained reasoning
collapses under logical consideration. It is certainly evident
from the analysis above.
For example, the majority suggested that the
arbitration panel made a policy decision.222 Yet, to justify this
conclusion the majority had to assert that the arbitration panel
ignored various bodies of law and instead substituted its own
“policy” judgment.223 In reality, the dissent demonstrated that the
opposite was true: the arbitration panel specifically referenced the
applicable law while never using the word “policy.”224 Similarly,
the majority displayed an unwillingness to even decide on a
standard of review. Rather than state whether or not “manifest
disregard” is the official test, the majority relegated the
standard to a footnote.225 It then asserted that the test for
reversal, which it did not adopt or analyze, was met.226 It is
strained reasoning to decide a case based on an undecided
standard of review.

219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226

Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1772.
HAIDT, supra note 12, at 94.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768.
Id.
Id. at 1780 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1768 n.3 (majority opinion).
See id. at 1777.
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e. Persistence
The majority opinion demonstrated persistence. The
dissent pointed out that this was not a final judgment, that the
majority was showing no deference to the arbitration panel,
and that even the alleged justifications for the decision were
belied by the factual record.227 But the majority was not swayed
by the requirements for appellate review, the law, or any facts
inconsistent with its conclusions.228
f.

Overconfidence

The majority could have let the arbitrators consider the
case in light of the Court’s guidance. Even if the majority
thought the arbitrators applied the wrong law, it did not have to
substitute its judgment for the arbitrators’, especially since the
parties affirmatively agreed to have the question of what the
word “arbitration” meant resolved by the panel.229 Yet, the Court
vacated, holding that there was no other possible result.230 This
is classic overconfidence.
In sum, the scorecard for this section looks like this:
Confirmation Bias
Substitution
Creation of “my-side” arguments
Strained reasoning
Persistence
Overconfidence
C.

X
X
X
X
X
X

Preemption

In this section, I examine the majority’s conclusion in
Concepcion that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts
California’s Discover Bank rule and can preempt some general
contract law defenses.231

227
228
229
230
231

See id. at 1778-80 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1777 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1766.
Id. at 1770.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011).
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The Discover Bank rule was developed based on
California’s unconscionability law.232 However, its primary
application was to arbitration clauses. The rule invalidated a
clause if it prohibited class actions in a context in which it was
alleged that there was widespread illegality that resulted in
small damages to each class member.233 The rule articulated
these requirements, but it was rooted in the holding in Discover
Bank that enforcing arbitration clauses in the consumer
context when damages are small but the illegal behavior is
class-wide would provide the defendant a “get-out-of-jail-free”
card.234 In short, California concluded that class action waivers
were unconscionable because they kept consumers, as a class,
from pursuing their rights.235
1. Scalia’s Preemption Analysis
I now turn to the majority’s preemption analysis. When
possible, the majority is not paraphrased so that there is no
chance for distortion. However, it is worth noting at the outset
that very little preemption law or preemption principles can be
quoted from the majority opinion. Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, simply did not include them.236 Instead, Scalia
began by acknowledging that the FAA contains a significant
carve out from any preemptive power it might have.
The final phrase of § 2, however, permits arbitration agreements to
be declared unenforceable “upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract.” This saving clause permits
agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by “generally applicable
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,” but
not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their
meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.237

These preliminary statements are important because
they recognize that the plain language of Section 2 contains a
clear and unequivocal savings clause that allows states to
refuse to enforce arbitration clauses if they run afoul of general
state contract law.238 This is consistent with the idea that the

232 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005),
abrogated by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
233 Id. at 1108-09.
234 Id. at 1108.
235 Id. at 1110.
236 See generally Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746.
237 Id.
238 Id.
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purpose of the FAA was to put arbitration clauses on “equal
footing” with other contracts.239 Justice Scalia continued:
When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular
type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting rule is
displaced by the FAA. But the inquiry becomes more complex when a
doctrine normally thought to be generally applicable, such as duress
or, as relevant here, unconscionability, is alleged to have been applied
in a fashion that disfavors arbitration. In Perry v. Thomas, for
example, we noted that the FAA’s preemptive effect might extend even
to grounds traditionally thought to exist “at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.” We said that a court may not “rely on the
uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law
holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would
enable the court to effect what . . . the state legislature cannot.”240

This is where things get interesting. Within a page of
having acknowledged that the FAA allows for state law
defenses, Justice Scalia articulated that perhaps even those
defenses are subject to preemption.241 In keeping with this, he
ultimately concluded that California’s Discover Bank rule is
preempted because it falls too heavily on arbitration clauses.242
He rejected the argument that although the rule is typically
applied to arbitration clauses, it also applies to any contract
that prohibits class actions regardless of whether or not the
contract contains an arbitration clause.243
Scalia asserted that “the overarching purpose of the
FAA, evident in the text of §§ 2, 3, and 4, is to ensure the
enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms
so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”244 Scalia rooted his
conclusion in the text of the FAA, which he noted often refers to
enforcing the terms of the arbitration agreement.245 Then, in an
important moment, he argued with the dissent that the
purpose of the FAA is more than just enforcing an agreement
according to its terms. He asserted that it is clear that there is a
second goal—to produce efficient resolution of disputes.246 He
stated that “a prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate is to
achieve
streamlined
proceedings
and
expeditious
results . . . .”247
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247

Id. at 1745.
Id. at 1747.
Id.
Id. at 1748.
Id. at 1750-51.
Id. at 1748.
Id.
Id. at 1749.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Having laid out these principles, Scalia concluded that
“California’s
Discover
Bank
rule . . . interferes
with
248
arbitration.” He asserted that the rule would essentially allow
any consumer to demand class arbitration because the rule
would work to strike the class action ban.249 He argued that the
requirement that damages be small in order for the Discover
Bank rule to apply is too malleable and that the requirement
that there be assertions of class-wide harm means nothing
because it only requires an allegation.250 He asserted that
attorneys will no longer seek to resolve individual claims if
they can resolve class claims and earn “higher fees.”251 He
argued that businesses will no longer resolve individual claims
either if they are faced with class arbitrations.252
He also responded to the dissent’s assertion that enforcing
the arbitration clause would prohibit consumers from pursuing
their claims, because each would be forced to pursue a small
dollar claim individually. He wrote:
The dissent claims that class proceedings are necessary to prosecute
small-dollar claims that might otherwise slip through the legal
system. But States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent
with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.253

Based on these arguments, Justice Scalia concluded
that “[b]ecause it stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,
California’s Discover Bank rule is preempted by the FAA.”254
2. Analysis
Justice Scalia’s analysis has some serious holes. The
first curious thing to note is that Justice Scalia did not cite the
basic law addressing preemption.
The basic law that one would have expected to find in the
opinion is uncontroversial. When addressing questions of express
or implied preemption, a court should begin its analysis
“with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
[are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” That assumption applies
248
249
250
251
252
253
254

Id.
Id. at 1750.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1753 (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
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with particular force when Congress has legislated in a field
traditionally occupied by the States. Thus, when the text of a
preemption clause is susceptible of more than one plausible reading,
courts ordinarily accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.255

However, it is true that just because a clause contains a
“savings clause,” exempting some areas of law from preemption,
this does not mean that conflict preemption cannot be found. “We
now conclude that the saving clause . . . does not bar the ordinary
working of conflict preemption principles.”256 This is especially
true if enforcing the savings clause would allow state law to
interrupt complex federal regulation.257
It is curious that none of this basic language appeared
in the majority opinion at all. Since the law makes clear that
preemption is especially inappropriate when (1) there is a direct
savings clause;258 (2) the body of law being considered is a field
typically left to states;259 or (3) there is no reason to believe that
the operation of state law would interfere with any federal
regulatory scheme,260 and since in Concepcion each of these traits
was present, failing to even mention them is hard to explain.
However, giving Scalia and the majority their best day,
perhaps they assumed that everyone knows the law, and so
only an analysis regarding conflict preemption was needed. To
this end, the majority held that although the savings clause
would normally allow state contract law defenses, there was a
risk that the clause would be read so broadly that it would conflict
with the purpose of the FAA.261 There is some reasonableness to
this argument. It is certainly true that too broad a reading of the
savings clause could allow states to effectively prohibit all
arbitration clauses by, for example, making it general state law
that all disputes must be resolved by a jury or must allow for a
full appeal.
As a result, to determine the proper result in Concepcion,
one must consider the purpose of the FAA and what result
enforcing the Discover Bank rule would produce. In other words,
does Discover Bank really conflict with the FAA?

255 Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (citations omitted).
256 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 870 (2000).
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008).
260 Geier, 529 U.S. at 870.
261 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011).
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The majority made clear what it believed the purpose of
the FAA is by disputing the dissent’s position.262 Specifically,
the majority argued that in addition to enforcing arbitration
agreements, the FAA has a second goal—to promote the
expeditious resolution of disputes.263 This recognition of the
second goal is certainly more in line with the statute’s text. If the
FAA were merely designed to enforce all arbitration clauses as
written, there would be no need for a savings clause. The FAA
could directly state that all arbitration clauses are enforceable,
or at a minimum, the FAA could omit the savings clause. This
did not happen, and that implies that the drafters of the FAA
intended, at a minimum, to let states weed out especially
offensive arbitration clauses.
This also seems to be what the United States Supreme
Court indicated in the past when it held that the FAA put
arbitration clauses on equal footing with other contracts.264 In
this framework, states retained the right to protect consumers
from duress, unconscionability, and other basic defenses to
contracts, but they could not generally view arbitration clauses,
merely because they were arbitration clauses, with hostility.
Taking the majority at its word then, the purpose of the
FAA is to enforce arbitration agreements in order to encourage
the efficient resolution of disputes.265 If this is true, all that
remains is to determine if the Discover Bank rule somehow
thwarted this purpose.
The Discover Bank rule allowed for class arbitration.266
So, as a starting point, it is a given that if the majority had
enforced the Discover Bank rule, then the case would have
proceeded to arbitration with the possibility of class certification.
To be fair, certification was not guaranteed, as the class
arbitrators consider all the typical class action factors in
considering a motion for class certification, and the burden of
proving the elements rests with the party filing the arbitration.267
But, assuming the class was certified and either a settlement
was reached or a decision was reached by the arbitrator, the

Id. at 1749.
Id. at 1743.
264 See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443-44 (2006).
265 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749, 1758.
266 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005),
abrogated by Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
267 AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS § 4
CLASS CERTIFICATION (effective Oct. 8, 2003), http://www.adr.org/ (follow “Rules & Procedures”
and “Search Rules” to access rules).
262
263
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claims of thousands, or maybe hundreds of thousands of people,
would have been resolved.
As a result, enforcing the Discover Bank rule would
have encouraged the efficient resolution of disputes in many
consumer claims involving small damages and allegations of
widespread fraud. Conversely, the majority’s decision guaranteed
that any dispute that was resolved would be resolved
individually, and it guaranteed that tens of thousands of claims,
if resolved at all, would have taken tens of thousands of
arbitrations and arbitrators, instead of just one. Of course, in
truth, it also guaranteed that most claims would never be
resolved at all, as individuals will rarely pursue claims for
small amounts of money due to a variety of factors including
the cost of an attorney, missed work time, travel time, and the
very limited potential reward for the effort spent.268
Consequently, the second goal, of encouraging the efficient
resolution of disputes, weighs in favor of enforcing the Discover
Bank rule, not striking it down.
Scalia might counter that class arbitration is not
efficient. However, this argument does not hold water.
According to data in Concepcion, the average class arbitration
takes about 600 days, whereas the average in-person
individual arbitration takes about six months.269 Reason
dictates then, that 10 individual arbitrations would require 60
months of arbitrator time (and 10 arbitrators in most cases),
whereas resolving the claims of 10,000 individuals in class
arbitration would take about 20 months (and one to three
arbitrators, depending on the rules). It is tough to justify
demanding individual arbitration in the name of efficiency.
Based on the facts, the result is not in doubt. By
enforcing AT&T’s arbitration clause as written, Justice Scalia
squelched the efficient resolution of thousands or hundreds of
thousands of claims.270 He ensured that even if AT&T were
268 There is good evidence that consumers cannot pursue
individual
arbitrations in a small damage setting. For example, in a case in which I was lead
counsel, discovery revealed that a payday lender who was charging over 400% interest
on loans had over 200,000 customers. See Woods v. QC Fin. Servs., Inc., 280 S.W.3d 90,
98 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008). The arbitration clause prohibited class actions. The business
had never engaged in a single arbitration. Experts in the case testified that consumers
would never find representation for claims of only a few hundred dollars. A Missouri
court struck the class action waiver as unconscionable because it would keep people
from pursuing claims. This is still the law of Missouri, but under AT&T, that law can
no longer apply to arbitration clauses, meaning they are on decidedly unequal footing
from other contracts.
269 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751.
270 Id. at 1759-60.
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breaking the law, it would not answer to most of the people it
harmed. He fractionalized what resolution would occur into
individual arbitrations that will be private so that there is no
precedent for others to follow and there is no reporting of the
result that could encourage others to pursue their claims. And
finally, since not all consumers know the law, by eliminating a
chance for class notice, Justice Scalia ensured that most
consumers would simply remain in the dark, with no knowledge
that their rights may have been violated.
Justice Scalia and the majority did all this in the name
of enforcing the purpose of the FAA.271 But it is hardly
consistent with the goal of encouraging the resolution of
disputes to stop the resolution of disputes. It is also strange that
although Justice Scalia lauds the efficiency of individual
arbitration,272 his decision guaranteed that individual
arbitrations will not occur.
Concepcion is also unsound from another perspective.
Justice Scalia, as mentioned early in this article, claims to be a
textual originalist.273 He derides those who would put the
purpose they ascribe to an act over the actual text of the act.
Yet, he does just that. The text of the FAA explicitly exempts
general state contract law defenses from preemption.274 As
such, the purpose of the FAA cannot merely be to enforce all
arbitration clauses. Instead, the purpose is to enforce clauses
when they are consistent with general state contract law.275
Similarly, the purpose is limited, as Scalia admitted, by the
desire to encourage the resolutions of disputes, not to stymy
them.276 Yet, Justice Scalia used the “purpose” of the FAA to
override its plain language. He held that because the FAA says
it does not preempt general state contract law, it sometimes
does.277 Reading the purpose of the law to be something other
than what its text states is a difficult decision for a textual
originalist to defend.
It should also be noted that in order to reach the
conclusion that what California asserts as general state
contract law is not really general state contract law, and is
instead a law that is hostile only to arbitration, the majority
271
272
273
274
275
276
277

Id. at 1753.
Id. at 1751.
Posner, supra note 3.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2011).
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Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.
Id.
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had to second-guess the California legislature and the
California Supreme Court. It is hard to imagine a reading of
the FAA that puts federal judges in the position of deciding
what state law really is. It is even stranger that Scalia, a
states’ rights advocate, engaged in such second-guessing.278
These inconsistencies did not escape the dissent. Justice
Breyer wrote:
The Federal Arbitration Act says that an arbitration agreement
“shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9
U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added). California law sets forth certain
circumstances in which “class action waivers” in any contract are
unenforceable. In my view, this rule of state law is consistent with
the federal Act’s language and primary objective. It does not “stan[d]
as an obstacle” to the Act’s “accomplishment and execution.”279

Justice Breyer also explained that by striking down the
Discover Bank rule, Justice Scalia did the opposite of what the
plain language of Section 2 requires. “[I]nsofar as we seek to
implement Congress’ intent, we should think more than twice
before invalidating a state law that does just what § 2 requires,
namely, puts agreements to arbitrate and agreements to litigate
‘upon the same footing.’”280
In sum, the majority’s discussion regarding conflict
preemption failed to set out the appropriate preemption law.
The majority also reached a conclusion at war with its own
stated rules. While professing that arbitration clauses should
be on equal footing with other contracts, Concepcion privileges
arbitration clauses in California, ensuring that in the future, a
class action waiver in an arbitration clause will be treated
differently than the same clause in a contract.281 Similarly,
Justice Scalia, who believes in focusing on the actual language
of a statute, managed to use the “purpose” of the statute to
overrule its own text, causing one to wonder how the purpose
can be different than the plain language.
These fundamental flaws in reasoning suggest that on
the issue of preemption, the majority got the question almost
entirely wrong. The decision reflects a significant departure from
existing preemption precedent, it runs afoul of the plain language
278 Harold Meyerson, Who’s Sovereign Now?, AM. PROSPECT (June 26, 2012),
http://prospect.org/article/who%E2%80%99s-sovereign-now (detailing Scalia’s comments
regarding the recent immigration reform and the impingement upon state sovereignty).
279 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1756 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
280 Id. at 1758.
281 Id. at 1761.
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of the very FAA that the majority says it is relying upon, and it
ignores the upside down results the decision produces.
3. Indicia of IR Abound
a. Confirmation Bias
The confirmation bias is probably most evident in
Justice Scalia’s failure to include any of the law about
preemption that would have undercut his arguments. As
discussed above, there is a significant body of law that would
suggest preemption is disfavored based on the facts of
Concepcion. At a minimum, one would have expected the
majority opinion to at least confront this law. Justice Scalia does
not. Instead, his opinion gravitated toward anything and
everything that could be used to support his result. Similarly,
when discussing the inefficiencies of class arbitration, Justice
Scalia picked only facts that support his argument while
completely failing to consider or acknowledge data that suggest
class arbitration is more efficient than class actions or that a
single class arbitration is more efficient than multiple individual
claims about the same underlying facts.
b. Substitution
The preemption issue required the majority to ask a
number of questions. For example, the majority should have asked:
1) Is this an issue that relates to a field typically policed by states?
2)

Does the FAA contain a savings clause?

3)

Is there any federal regulatory scheme that the Discover Bank
rule interferes with?

4)

What is the purpose of the FAA?

5)

What impact will the Discover Bank rule have on the FAA’ s
purpose?

6)

Is it possible that class arbitration will serve the FAA’s purpose?

7)

What does our past arbitration precedent teach about how to
handle a clause that, if enforced, will ensure some people cannot
pursue their claims?
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Instead, it appears the majority simply asked, “Do
businesses like class arbitration,” and then answered with a
definitive “no.”282 This provides an explanation for why the
majority dove headfirst into describing the problems with class
arbitration and then concluded that enforcing the Discover Bank
rule would be unacceptable. The majority concluded that
businesses do not want to go to class arbitration and substituted
that as an answer to a series of far more difficult questions
about preemption.283
c. Creation of My-Side Arguments
With relation to preemption, the majority did not
produce a significant number of “my-side” arguments. Instead,
it provided very little direct support for preemption at all. The
only exception is the majority’s list of all the ways that class
arbitration is fundamentally different from bilateral
arbitration.284 This list of my-side arguments is discussed in the
following section, which focuses exclusively on the majority’s
treatment of class arbitration in both decisions.
d. Strained Reasoning
The clearest example of strained reasoning in
Concepcion is Justice Scalia’s abandonment of his own
principles. When a textual originalist overrules the text of an
act, thereby turning an act that is anti-preemptive on its face into
a preemptive one, IR is apparent. There is no explanation for how
a carve out for states’ rights could lead to a conclusion that the
FAA preempts states’ rights other than the fact that the majority
engaged in its reasoning only after it reached its decision.
There is also a fundamental inconsistency in the
majority’s reasoning. Although it argued that the goal of the
FAA is to put arbitration clauses on an equal footing with
contracts, in reality, the decision privileges arbitration clauses.
California law explicitly allowed for a determination that any
contract or clause within it was unconscionable; this was
generally applicable law that could apply to arbitration clauses
but did not target them.285 Yet, after Concepcion, if a business
prohibits class actions in an arbitration clause, the provision is
282
283
284
285

Id. at 1750.
See id. at 1750-51.
Id. at 1750.
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1668, 1670.5(a) (West 2012).
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enforceable. If the same company were to ban class actions in a
contract, the provision would fail. As such, the majority opinion
violates its own guidelines by favoring arbitration clauses.
e. Persistence
Persistence is especially prevalent in the majority’s
consideration of preemption. The dissent forcefully pointed out
that the majority’s decision (1) will stop people from resolving
disputes, and (2) is in conflict with a plain reading of the
statute.286 The majority said the first concern does not matter and
never even addressed the second issue. The majority’s inability to
meaningfully consider points that reasonably challenged the
alleged rationale for its opinion is a classic marker of IR.
f.

Overconfidence

The majority’s opinion displays a certitude that is hard
to justify. Perhaps the most telling sign of overconfidence is the
majority’s need to state that many class actions are in
terrorem.287 The assertion that many class actions are just a way
to extort money from businesses through frivolous claims is
completely unnecessary in the case. If the majority knew that its
result was shaky, it would almost certainly avoid any language
that would suggest that the opinion was driven by a bias
against class claims. However, the majority was so convinced
that its reasoning was sound that it included superfluous
language. This displays the majority’s lack of awareness of the
logical fallacies in its argument.
In the end, the scorecard looks like this:
Confirmation Bias
Substitution
Creation of “my-side” arguments
Strained reasoning
Persistence
Overconfidence

286
287

X
X
X
X
X

Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1757-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1752 (majority opinion).
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The Majority’s Unsupported Remarks Regarding
Arbitration

In both Stolt and Concepcion, the majority discussed (1)
why class arbitration is so fundamentally different from
arbitration, and (2) why a business could not possibly desire
class arbitration.288 In making these arguments, the majority
departs from reasoning that is supported by the facts, providing
some of the starkest examples of IR.
1. The Majority’s Statements Regarding Class
Arbitration and Class Actions
The majority began its critique of class arbitration in
Stolt. Close on its heels came Concepcion, which, relatively
gratuitously, returned to the topic of class arbitration. Along the
way, the majority also managed to assert that class actions are
often frivolous and an unfair burden to businesses.289
a. The Majority’s Assertions in Stolt
In Stolt, Justice Alito wrote for the majority that “[a]n
implicit agreement to authorize class-action arbitration,
however, is not a term that the arbitrator may infer solely from
the fact of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.”290 In doing so, as
discussed above, he took the issue away from the arbitrator,
where the parties agreed it would be decided, and made it an
issue for the Court to decide. He supported his assertion that
class arbitration can never be inferred from the word arbitration
by suggesting that class arbitration changes the very “nature of
arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the
parties consented to it by simply agreeing to submit their
disputes to an arbitrator.”291 Alito explained further:
In bilateral arbitration, parties forgo the procedural rigor and
appellate review of the courts in order to realize the benefits of private
dispute resolution: lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and the
ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes.
But the relative benefits of class-action arbitration are much less
assured, giving reason to doubt the parties’ mutual consent to resolve
disputes through class wide arbitration.
288 Id. at 1750-51; Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct.
1758, 1776 (2010).
289 Stolt, 130 S. Ct. at 1776.
290 Id. at 1775.
291 Id.
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Consider just some of the fundamental changes brought about by the
shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action arbitration. An
arbitrator chosen according to an agreed-upon procedure no longer
resolves a single dispute between the parties to a single agreement,
but instead resolves many disputes between hundreds or perhaps even
thousands of parties. Under the Class Rules, “the presumption of
privacy and confidentiality” that applies in many bilateral arbitrations
“shall not apply in class arbitrations,” thus potentially frustrating the
parties’ assumptions when they agreed to arbitrate. The arbitrator’s
award no longer purports to bind just the parties to a single
arbitration agreement, but adjudicates the rights of absent parties
as well. And the commercial stakes of class-action arbitration are
comparable to those of class-action litigation even though the scope
of judicial review is much more limited.292

The quoted text above, giving the majority its fair due,
identifies three specific reasons why class arbitration is so
different that it would be irrational to assume any party would
ever agree to it. (The majority actually lists four, but the first and
third—that the arbitrator considers and decides the claims of
more than one person—are exactly the same thing.)
The issues identified are:
1) An arbitrator “no longer resolves a single dispute.” Instead, the
decision could apply to hundreds or thousands of disputes.293
2) Under the class rules, there is less of a presumption of privacy
and this could frustrate the will of the parties.294
3) The stakes of a class arbitration are like those of a class action,
but there is less judicial review of a class arbitration.295

b. Analyzing the Majority’s Assertions in Stolt
The first thing that may jump out at a reader is that
while the majority couched its concerns about class arbitration
in terms of frustrating the intent of the parties, what the
majority really meant is that they will frustrate the defendant.
The plaintiff in this case was asking for class arbitration,
suggesting it would not have been frustrated at all. Below, each
alleged problem with class arbitration is considered in turn.

292
293
294
295

Id. at 1775-76 (citations and references omitted).
Id. at 1776.
Id.
Id.
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Resolution of Multiple Disputes

As discussed in the section relating to preemption,
arguing that resolving multiple claims at once is somehow
worse than resolving individual claims one-by-one is strange. If
it is true that the goal of the FAA is to enforce agreements to
facilitate informal, streamlined proceedings, then why would it
be assumed that when a party refers to arbitration, that party
can never mean arbitration of more than one dispute at a time?
At a sheer mathematical level, class arbitration is far more
efficient at resolving disputes than individual arbitration.
But the majority might respond by suggesting that
although it may be good policy to encourage class arbitration,
what matters is what the parties intended. Does this argument
win the day? If we are to assume that the parties included an
arbitration clause in order to resolve disputes quickly and
efficiently, then why would we assume the parties eschewed
class arbitration? This assumption seems even stranger given
that class arbitration was becoming common by the time Stolt
was decided, meaning parties certainly must have known it
existed. In the end, the assertion that no one could think
arbitration includes class arbitration is dubious at best.
ii.

The Presumption of Privacy Is Eroded in Class
Arbitration

Justice Alito suggested that the lack of privacy could
“potentially” frustrate the parties.296 This tepid statement was
as far as he could go. In truth, not all parties demand privacy
in arbitration and although AAA rules require the publication
of the class action complaint and final award, they do not
require the publication of most documents, including the most
potentially sensitive documents, such as dispositive motions or
motions for class certification.297 Similarly, the right to seal
documents exists in arbitration, just as it does in court. As a
result, the suggestion that the parties “potentially” could be
worried about privacy is largely advisory.
Alito’s focus on the potential frustration of the actual
parties in Stolt was especially strange. This is because in Stolt,
Id. at 1776.
AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS
§§ 9 & 10 CONFIDENTIALITY CLASS ARBITRATION DKT & FORM AND PUBLICATION OF
AWARDS (effective Oct. 8, 2003), available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?url=/cs/
groups/commercial/documents/document/dgdf/mda0/~edisp/adrstg_004129.pdf.
296
297
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the parties agreed to have their dispute resolved under the
AAA Class Arbitration Rules.298 Those rules provide for limited
disclosures.299 Apparently, neither of the parties was troubled
by this because if they were, they did not have to stipulate to it.
Why, then, did Justice Alito step in and express a concern the
parties did not and could not have had?
Finally, the willingness to worry about “potential”
problems, even though they were not proven, is new to the
Court. In a previous case, the Court was asked to invalidate an
arbitration clause that required a mobile home purchaser to
arbitrate.300 In that case, the plaintiff argued that the costs of
arbitration could overwhelm her and prevent her from pursing
her statutory rights.301 The Court rejected her challenge,
holding that “[t]he ‘risk’ that [Plaintiff] will be saddled with
prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the invalidation of
an arbitration agreement.”302 Why is an individual plaintiff’s
fear of high arbitration costs speculative if the invented fears of
a company like Stolt are sufficient to merit the Court’s
attention? In the end, the majority’s concerns about limited
privacy prove more fiction than fact.
iii.

The Stakes Are High in Class Arbitration and
There Is Not Sufficient Judicial Review

The final concern about class arbitration is that there is
simply no way businesses would agree to class arbitration
because it is not subject to judicial review but could involve
large sums of money.303 This argument is probably the hardest
of the trilogy of less-than-convincing reasons to defend. First,
the mere assertion that arbitration is insufficient to handle
some claims was roundly rejected as a losing argument in
Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson, in which the Court struck down a
challenge to an arbitration clause, explaining that concerns
about the arbitrator’s qualification, lack of process, or discovery
were inconsistent with the FAA.304 As such, when the majority
argued that the stakes are too high in class arbitration, it is
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1765 (2010).
AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS,
§§ 9 & 10 (effective Oct. 8, 2003).
300 Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 82 (2000).
301 Id.
302 Id. at 91.
303 AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011) (asserting
that the risks of class arbitration are too significant for defendants).
304 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27 (1991).
298
299
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essentially stating a position hostile to arbitration, and this is a
position the same majority has consistently said is preempted
by the FAA.305
There are additional concerns. The majority implicitly
expresses a belief that class arbitration is almost never
attractive to businesses because it would require risking too
much with too little judicial review.306 This is an inherently
biased position. The majority is concerned that businesses would
never agree to class arbitration given the stakes, but where was
this reasoning in any case in which an individual was being
compelled to arbitrate?
Assume a female is fired from her job. She believes it is
because she refused to have sex with her manager. She wants
to sue to either get her job back or recover damages because
she cannot find work and has two kids. However, the employer
asked her to sign an arbitration clause when she began
working. It applies to “any and all disputes.”
Can anyone honestly suggest that for this mother, the
stakes of her arbitration are lower than those of the parties in
Stolt? She gets one shot at her claim. Winning might be the
difference between long-term unemployment (and all that comes
with it) and gainful employment. The arbitrator might not be
that qualified. There is no meaningful judicial review. Discovery
might be limited. And if anything goes wrong, she has no other
options for pursing her rights. Yet, the Supreme Court has
routinely held that these concerns, far from being barriers to
enforcing the clause, are actually questions that are hostile to
arbitration and are therefore preempted. If the stakes do not
matter when the party is a person, why do they matter when
the party is a business?
In any event, even if there is reason to have sympathy
for businesses that might lose too much in class arbitration, the
assumption that no business would agree to high stakes
arbitration is simply unsupportable. Many businesses view
arbitration as a reasonable forum where large claims can be
resolved once and for all.307 The growth of international
305 Id. at 30. “Such generalized attacks on arbitration ‘res[t] on suspicion of
arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to
would-be complainants,’ and as such, they are ‘far out of step with our current strong
endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes.’”
306 Id. at 32 n.4.
307 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of Arbitration
Agreements, 22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 259, 277 (1990) (demonstrating the growth as
arbitration began to become a more attractive option).
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arbitration to resolve business disputes is well documented.308
Justice Breyer pointed out other examples.309 For example, he
noted in his dissent that several businesses voluntarily entered
into arbitrations in which the stakes exceeded $500 million and
in one case topped $1 billion.310
In the end, the majority’s concerns about the risks of
class arbitration reveal more about the majority than about
class arbitration. The reasons given for conclusively holding that
no business would ever read the word “arbitration” to include
class arbitration are unsound and unpersuasive.
c. The Majority’s Statements about Class Arbitration in
Concepcion
The majority returned to its discussion of class
arbitration in Concepcion. While making some of the same
observations as in Stolt, Justice Scalia took the opportunity to
add a few new statements about class arbitration. He asserted
that “the switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices the
principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and makes
the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate
procedural morass than final judgment.”311 He argued that this
is true because in class arbitration the arbitrator has to decide
whether the class will be certified, whether the named parties
are sufficiently representative (which is actually just one of the
elements of class certification), and how discovery will occur.312
The first two concerns articulated by Scalia are the
same thing said two different ways; both relate to the need for
the arbitrator to decide if class certification is appropriate. The
fact that the arbitrator engages in rigorous analysis as to
whether class certification is appropriate is only a concern if
one agrees with Justice Scalia that making sure a class is
appropriate, as opposed to certifying all cases as class actions, is
somehow harmful to businesses. Of course, in reality, the very
mechanisms Justice Scalia criticized actually provide procedural
safeguards. Similar procedural matters can and do occur in
individual arbitrations. For example, motions to compel
308 See Robert B. Kovacs, A Transnational Approach to the Arbitrability of
Insolvency Proceedings in International Arbitration, 21 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 5 ART. 3 (2012).
309 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1760 (2011) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
310 Id.
311 Id. at 1751.
312 Id.
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discovery, motions to dismiss, and even motions for partial
summary judgment are entertained in some complex individual
arbitrations.313
The next concern articulated by Scalia is that the
arbitrator must oversee discovery.314 However, this is no different
than in many individual arbitrations. For example, some
individual arbitrations are between two giant, multinational
companies. These will often involve a panel of three arbitrators
and have complex rules for administering the claim.315 Justice
Scalia omitted this information.
As mentioned previously, he suggested that a “cursory”
review of bilateral versus class arbitration reveals that class
arbitration takes longer.316 He complained that no AAA class
arbitrations, at the time Concepcion was handed down, had
resulted in final judgments.317 These are strange criticisms.
First, the amount of time spent per claim resolved is obviously
lower in class arbitrations. If a class arbitration resolved a
meager 100 claims in 600 days, that is six days per claim. There
was no evidence that any individual arbitration lasts only six
days; instead, evidence before the Court suggested that the
average individual arbitration takes six months.318 The dissent
also provided reason to believe Scalia’s data was incomplete.
The dissent pointed to AAA’s amicus brief in Concepcion, in
which AAA provided proof that class arbitrations are resolved
faster than class actions in courts.319 This apples-to-apples
comparison, instead of comparing an individual arbitration to a
class arbitration, suggests that class arbitration provides the
same efficiencies that individual arbitration does.
But the majority opinion ignored all of this. Just as in
Stolt, the majority’s errors seem to derive from the fact that the
313 International arbitration is complex and can involve only two “individuals.”
But see Commercial Arbitration Rules & Mediation Procedures Including Procedures
for Large, Complex Commercial Disputes. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES (2009), available at http://www.adr.org/ (follow “Rules &
Procedures” and “Search Rules” to access rules) referencing discovery, depositions and
other features common to litigation.
314 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747.
315 For example, Dow Chemical recently announced it received almost $2.5
billion in an international arbitration, demonstrating that even complex international
matters with high dollar stakes are often resolved by businesses via arbitration. Dow
Announces Closure of Proceedings in K-Dow Arbitration, INVESTOR CENTER (Mar. 4,
2013 8:35 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2013/03/04/dow-announces-closure-ofproceedings-in-k-dow-arbi/.
316 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751.
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 Id. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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majority focused exclusively on the defendants’ perspective, not
on the claimant and class, all of whom would almost certainly
be happier with class arbitration.
Justice Scalia also bemoaned the fact that class
arbitration “requires procedural formality.”320 Specifically, he cited
the fact that the class would need to receive class notice.321
Besides the fact that class notice often lets people recover
damages without participating in the day-to-day litigation of the
case—the most efficient resolution of claims possible—it is also a
safeguard for all involved. Class notice lets people object to bad
settlements, and it lets people who do not want to be involved in a
lawsuit against a business opt out. In this light, Justice Scalia’s
concern with procedural formality was at war with the majority’s
criticism in Stolt—namely that businesses were being asked to
risk too much with too little protection. In the end, the majority
criticized class arbitration on the one hand for having too much
procedure, and on the other hand, for having too little.
But these concerns were merely precursors. It is Scalia’s
“third” set of concerns, as he numbers them, that is most
confounding. Justice Scalia overtly stated that “class arbitration
greatly increases risks to defendants. Informal procedures do of
course have a cost: The absence of multilayered review makes it
more likely that errors will go uncorrected.”322 This criticism, that
businesses will be at risk, echoes the criticism Justice Alito
raised in Stolt. It is, by all measures, inappropriate. For two
decades before Concepcion, the Court explicitly prohibited
individuals from suggesting arbitration was not a good place to
resolve some claims.323
The Court, including Justice Scalia, suggested that such
challenges to the very nature of arbitration were preempted by
the FAA, as they demonstrated hostility toward arbitration.
Yet, when Justice Scalia feared that businesses might be forced
to face the realities of arbitration, he openly conceded that
arbitration can cause errors and then sought to let the business
escape from the very system he previously lauded.
Scalia’s inconsistencies did not stop there. He then
suggested that because businesses could seek appellate review of
Id. at 1751 (majority opinion).
Id.
322 Id. at 1752.
323 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991).
In Gilmer, the plaintiff argued that arbitrators might be biased, that they were not
trained to handle some matters, that discovery was limited, and that there was no
written decision required. The Court rejected each of these arguments as running afoul
of the FAA’s presumption in favor of arbitration.
320
321
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class certification in court under a de novo review, but under
arbitration rules the review would be severely limited, businesses
are further prejudiced. He argued that the Court can almost
never effectively review an arbitration decision because it must
show extreme deference to the arbitrator. This irony is
palpable. In Stolt, issued only one year earlier, the Court
vacated an arbitrator’s decision, showing seemingly no deference
at all. It is equally ironic that the very thing that Justice Scalia
previously said makes arbitration efficient (lack of judicial
involvement) quickly became one of his arguments for why
businesses should not have to arbitrate at all.
In all, the majority’s treatment of class arbitration is
shifting sand. The majority suggested businesses would never
choose class arbitration despite proof that they do so all the
time.324 The majority simultaneously lamented the lack of
procedural review in class arbitration and then criticized its
procedural protections relating to class certification.325 The
majority asserted that class arbitration is inefficient, but then
failed to compare class arbitration to class actions in court,
instead comparing it to the resolution of one individual claim.
These inconsistencies, and many more, suggest that something
besides cold rationality is going on in the decisions.
2. Markers of IR
a. Confirmation Bias
Confirmation bias consumes the majority’s discussion of
class arbitration. For example, the majority focused on statistics
provided by AAA to prove class arbitration takes longer than an
individual arbitration.326 Although these facts, presented in
isolation, might support the majority’s conclusion, it is clear the
majority ignored the other statistics, also from AAA, that noted
that class arbitrations were faster than class actions.327
Similarly, Scalia’s decision to criticize class arbitration
for having procedural safeguards like discovery or a class
certification hearing was illogical. The conservative majority
suggested in Stolt and again in Concepcion that one of the
problems with class arbitration was that businesses were not
324
325
326

Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750.
Id. at 1752.
Id. at 1751 (citing Hall Street Assocs. LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576,

578 (2008)).
327

Id. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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protected.328 Under this logic, giving a business real discovery and
requiring the plaintiff to prove all the elements of class
certification would ensure a fairer result. And for this reason,
this extra “procedure” should be a positive. Scalia did not see
this. Instead, he was focused on anything that might support
his argument.
The same is true of the lists of “facts” about class
arbitration that were provided by the majority. The first
explained why no business would choose class arbitration. The
second list is similar, and detailed just how different class
arbitration is from bilateral arbitration. The first list
completely ignored the potential benefits of resolving large
claims quickly and with arbitrators specifically trained in the
area of law at issue. The second list ignored a host of ways that
class arbitration is exactly like bilateral arbitration.
Finally, the majority grasped for supporting arguments
in Concepcion when criticizing characteristics of arbitration,
such as an arbitrator’s potential lack of understanding of the
law or subject matter and the lack of the right to a full appeal.
As discussed, the Court explicitly rejected these arguments in
earlier decisions. They should have been preempted, as they
express hostility toward arbitration.
b. Substitution
The Court, to its credit, does not engage in substitution
when talking about class arbitration.
c. Creation of “My-Side” Arguments
Some of the most obvious examples of creating “my-side”
arguments exist in the discussion of class arbitration. As
discussed, in Stolt the majority produced a list of four different
things about class arbitration that made it unlikely anyone
would agree to it. However, an examination of the list reveals
that one reason was listed twice (that the arbitrator considers
and decides the claims of more than one person), another was a
concern that the parties could not reasonably have (that class
arbitration could allow the disclosure of some information
about the arbitration), and the third was inherently biased and
inaccurate (that the company just has too much to lose to ever
agree to class arbitration). As cognitive science predicts, smart
328

Id. at 1749 (majority opinion).
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people like the members of the majority are adept at producing
ever-longer lists of support for their beliefs, but they are not
good at producing or considering “other-side” arguments.329
This one-sided discussion of the merits of arbitration is
painfully obvious because even spending a few minutes
thinking about class arbitration reveals a bevy of reasons a
business might chose it. For example, unlike in court, parties
in arbitration are able to vet arbitrators at AAA.330 They can
strike people they think would be unfair after reviewing their
resumes and the cases they have worked on in the past.
Similarly, many businesses might benefit from finality instead
of prolonged litigation costs. And certainly the somewhat
limited nature of discovery in arbitration could actually benefit
a business that is facing a class action. Similarly, Justice Alito
never acknowledged that AAA requires all arbitrators who
handle class arbitrations be specially trained in this area,
unlike courts, which do not require judges be specifically
trained in class action litigation to handle such cases in court.
Justice Scalia engaged in the same one-sided argument
creation in Concepcion. He provided a list of all the ways that
class arbitration fundamentally changes arbitration.331 Yet, he
did not acknowledge even one of the ways that class arbitration
is identical to bilateral arbitration (unless it was to suggest
that suddenly the trait was bad). For example, he could have
created an “other-side” list that recognized the following
similarities between bilateral arbitration and class arbitration:
less formal rules of evidence, arbitrators trained in the specific
field that the case involves, narrower discovery, limited judicial
review, lack of precedent, informal hearings (including phone
hearings, etc.), and faster resolution times than similar cases
in court. If Justice Scalia had acknowledged how very similar
class arbitration is to individual arbitration, the analysis might
have been much different.
d. Strained Reasoning
Strained reasoning appeared throughout the discussion of
class arbitration. It appeared when Justice Alito asserted that
businesses hate arbitration when it is high stakes but failed to
mention that some businesses choose arbitration to resolve
329
330
331

HAIDT, supra note 12, at 80-81.
AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES (2009).
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.
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enormous business-to-business disputes.332 Similarly, faulty
reasoning occurs when the majority carefully considered the risks
businesses face in class arbitration, but never considered the risks
individuals face when their entire claim is before an arbitrator.
Strained reasoning occurred when the court invented arguments
for businesses (like concerns about privacy that could not have
been present in Stolt) or when it actually criticized class
arbitration for having procedural safeguards but then argued
class arbitration is bad precisely because it does not have more
procedural safeguards in the form of appeals. Similar
contradictions occurred when the majority criticized class
arbitration for resolving multiple claims at once, while
simultaneously arguing that the purpose of the FAA is to promote
efficient resolution of claims. And one cannot help but wonder
how the majority can argue that arbitrators might not be
qualified to handle class arbitration when this argument (1) was
not only hostile to arbitration and therefore preempted but also
(2) completely ignored the fact that some courts are unqualified
whereas arbitrators at AAA are trained in class arbitration.
e. Persistence
The dissent pointed out that class arbitration is faster
than a class action and that in the absence of class arbitration,
consumers will not resolve their disputes at all, much less
efficiently do so.333 The majority never even addressed the first
point, and as for the second, it suggested that it does not matter
whether consumers can vindicate their rights, because even a
concern like that cannot get in the way of enforcing the purpose of
the FAA.334 This provides another example of when a thoughtful
counterargument is totally ignored, consistent with IR.
f.

Overconfidence

Although it is clear the majority thinks it is right, there is
notan overt showing of overconfidence when discussing class
arbitration.

332
333
334

See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010).
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
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In the end, the scorecard looks like this:
Confirmation Bias
Substitution
Creation of “my-side” arguments
Strained reasoning
Persistence
Overconfidence
E.

X
X
X
X

Concepcion Overrules Past Precedent, But It Never
Acknowledges It

This section briefly outlines the “vindication of rights”
doctrine that existed in Supreme Court decisions since at least
1985.335 This section concludes that although the vindication of
rights doctrine would have suggested that the Discover Bank
rule was legally appropriate, Justice Scalia did not even
mention it. This section also concludes that his decision
effectively overrules the vindication of rights doctrine. This is
problematic because Justice Scalia was part of the majority
who recognized the doctrine in the past. 336
1. Vindication of Rights
As late as the 1970s, the United States Supreme Court
treated arbitration as appropriate to resolve contract disputes
in the labor setting, but inappropriate for almost anything else.
For example, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, the Court held
that “if an arbitral decision is based solely upon the arbitrator’s
view of the requirements of enacted legislation, rather than on
an interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement, the
arbitrator has exceeded the scope of the submission.”337 In other
words, an arbitrator was not supposed to serve as an interpreter
of complex statutory law; an arbitrator was limited to deciding
the rules of the shop.338 This led the Court to the conclusion that
335 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
626-27 (1985).
336 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991),
in which Scalia joined the majority opinion, including the section that asserted that “so
long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of
action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and
deterrent function.”
337 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974).
338 Id.
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even if an employee arbitrated discrimination claims, the
employee was still free to pursue those claims in Court, as courts
were the final word on such important issues.339
This view held sway until the 1980s and was not fully
eradicated until 1991—the date when the Supreme Court
began to regularly demonstrate its adoration of arbitration. It
was then that Gardner-Denver was essentially overruled. This
happened in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., in which
the Supreme Court was asked to consider whether it should
enforce an arbitration clause that would require the plaintiff, a
securities trader, to arbitrate his employment dispute.340 In the
opinion, the Court specifically rejected assertions that the
arbitrator might be biased, that discovery was too limited in
arbitration, and that the lack of a written opinion was
problematic.341 Instead, the Court strongly held that claims, even
serious ones, could be resolved in arbitration.342 In a footnote,
the Court implicitly overruled Gardner-Denver. It wrote:
The Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., . . . expressed the
view that arbitration was inferior to the judicial process for resolving
statutory claims. That mistrust of the arbitral process, however, has
been undermined by our recent arbitration decisions. We are well
past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of
arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the
development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute
resolution.343

For support, the Court cited to Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, (1985).344 This
change from suspicion of arbitration to a full embrace of its use in
all settings is important because although the Court decided that
any claim could be sent to arbitration, it did reiterate a
safeguard.345 Again citing to Mitsubishi, the Court noted that an
arbitral forum was appropriate for all sorts of claims, but only
“[s]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [its]
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum . . . .”346
This safeguard was critical. It meant that arbitration was
acceptable for any claim, no matter how serious, but this
Id. at 59-60.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23-24.
341 Id. at 30-32.
342 Id. at 26.
343 Id. at 34 n.5.
344 Id.
345 Id. at 26, 28.
346 Id. at 28 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)).
339
340

2013]

MIS-CONCEPCION

163

presumption was qualified by the recognition that if an
arbitration clause prevented a party from vindicating statutory
rights, the clause could fail. This seemed reasonable since
arbitration was supposed to be an alternative method of resolving
disputes, not a place where disputes could not be resolved at all.
The “vindication of rights” doctrine was reiterated in
subsequent cases. For example, in Green Tree Fin. Corp.Alabama v. Randolph, the plaintiff asserted that the cost of
arbitration would prohibit her from pursuing her claim.347 The
Court rejected her assertion as unsupported by evidence.348
However, the Court’s opinion strongly suggested that the
“vindication of rights” theory was alive and well. The Court
concluded that “a party seek[ing] to invalidate an arbitration
agreement on the ground that arbitration would be prohibitively
expensive . . . bears the burden of showing the likelihood of
incurring such costs.”349 This statement implicitly recognized
that if proven, the inability to vindicate rights is a bar to
enforcing arbitration clauses.350
This doctrine was reinforced by state court decisions.
This included the California Supreme Court, when it handed
down Discover Bank. In Discover Bank the California Supreme
Court explained that consumers could not pursue small dollar
claims individually.351 The Court noted that lawyers could not
afford to take such small claims, and similarly, it would often be
irrational for consumers to pursue such claims. The problem, as
the court aptly noted, was that if no one could sue businesses for
small dollar claims, then businesses could profit from illegality.
Class action and arbitration waivers are not, in the abstract,
exculpatory clauses. But because, as discussed above, damages in
consumer cases are often small and because a company which
wrongfully exacts a dollar from each of millions of customers will reap
a handsome profit the class action is often the only effective way to
halt and redress such exploitation.352

Based on this reasoning, the California Supreme Court
struck the arbitration clause because it was unconscionable.
However, what is clear is that the California Supreme Court’s
reasoning also fit well with the vindication of rights doctrine.
Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 83-84 (2000).
Id. at 90-92 & n.6.
349 Id. at 92.
350 See id.
351 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108-09 (Cal. 2005),
abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
352 Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
347
348
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The California Supreme Court concluded that if it enforced the
clause, consumers could not enforce their rights. Calling this
unconscionable, or concluding that it bars the vindication of
rights, are really two sides of the same coin.
Other courts more explicitly made this connection. For
example, in Whitney v. Alltel, a Missouri court stated:
“Even claims arising under a statute designed to further important
social policies may be arbitrated because so long as the prospective
litigant effectively may vindicate his or her statutory cause of action
in the arbitral forum, the statute serves its functions.” However, in
some instances, where the arbitration provision is so prohibitive as to
effectively deprive a party of his or her statutory rights, the
arbitration agreement may be invalidated.353

That court went on to find a class action waiver
unconscionable after concluding that the wavier would deprive
consumers of the right to pursue their claims.354
Subsequent to Whitney and Discover Bank, many other
states also struck down class action waivers after concluding
that they would exculpate defendants from liability.355 As a
result, when Concepcion reached the Supreme Court, many
believed that the Discover Bank rule was merely a rephrasing of
the vindication of rights doctrine and therefore, rather than
being preempted, advanced the purpose of the FAA.
2. Scalia’s Position in Concepcion
Despite what some viewed as an alignment between
California’s law and the vindication of rights doctrine, in
Concepcion the majority concluded that California law stood as
a barrier to enforcing the purpose of the FAA.356
The dissent’s response was to point out that since any
customer who arbitrated against AT&T was likely to receive
about $30, enforcing the class action wavier would simply ensure
that no one pursued claims against AT&T.357 In essence, the
dissent was invoking the vindication of rights doctrine. This
argument is persuasive. But Justice Scalia dismissed it out of
353 Whitney v. Alltel Commc’ns., Inc., 173 S.W.3d 300, 311 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)
(quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp.,-Ala v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (alterations omitted)).
354 Id.
355 See, e.g., Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 274 (Ill. 2006);
Muhammad v. Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del., 912 A.2d 88, 99 (N.J. 2006); Fiser
v. Dell Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215, 1221 (N.M. 2008); Scott v. Cingular Wireless,
161 P.3d 1000, 1007-08 (2007).
356 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1742 (2011).
357 Id. at 1760-61.
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hand. He wrote: “The dissent claims that class proceedings are
necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims that might otherwise
slip through the legal system. But States cannot require a
procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable
for unrelated reasons.”358 And with those two sentences, Justice
Scalia wrote away the dissent and struck the Discover Bank rule.
3. Analysis
What is interesting to note at the outset is that Justice
Scalia never mentioned the vindication of rights doctrine at all in
Concepcion. Much like he did with the preemption issue, he simply
left out huge pieces of law as if they did not exist. This relieved him
of explaining how it would advance the purpose of the FAA to
stymy valid claims. Instead, without explanation, and ignoring the
dissent’s point, Justice Scalia either (1) overruled the vindication of
rights doctrine without admitting it, or (2) forgot it existed.
By any measure, failing to reference an established
doctrine and then dismissing the same doctrine when raised by
the dissent is an example of reasoning infected by IR. The
result is a decision with troubling implications. By ignoring
binding precedent about the vindication of rights doctrine, Justice
Scalia made the FAA stand as a tool for eliminating claims, not
efficiently resolving them. He made the FAA a tool for businesses
who seek to avoid answering to thousands of plaintiffs at once—a
result that hardly seems consistent with the purpose of the FAA.
The result is that now businesses include beautifully written
arbitration clauses in their contracts, not with the purpose of
using them, but with the assurance that such clauses can
eliminate class actions altogether.
4. Indicia of IR
a. Confirmation bias
The majority displayed confirmation bias by selecting
language from the FAA about the value of arbitration without
paying any attention at all to the vindication of rights doctrine.
Specifically, the majority is quick to quote law that says that there
is a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,”359 but it fails to
consider the Court’s own recent assertions that an arbitration
358
359

Id. at 1753 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1745 (citation omitted).
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clause is enforceable “so long as the prospective litigant effectively
may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum.”360
b. Substitution
The majority did not engage in substitution. It never
addressed the question of whether its decision was in line with
the vindication of rights doctrine.
c. Creation of My-Side Arguments
My-side arguments abound in the majority’s opinion. The
majority invented many reasons why striking the class action
waiver would hurt AT&T.361 And it invented multiple justifications
for how consumers could try to resolve their claims individually.362
For example, the majority asserted that it is unlikely the claims
will go unresolved because AT&T’s clause obligates it to pay a large
sum of money if the settlement award exceeds AT&T’s settlement
offer.363 Similarly, the majority pointed out AT&T’s clause requires
it to pay attorney fees and lets consumers file their claims online
for free.364 Yet, the majority never discussed the fact that most
consumers will never find representation, that it is economically
irrational for consumers to pursue $30 claims, or the fact that
consumers have to read and understand AT&T’s complicated
arbitration clause to even know their rights to begin with.365
Although dozens of arguments that support enforcing
the Discover Bank rule spring to mind, the majority failed to
acknowledge or think of even one. Indeed, while the majority
invented a parade of horrible events for companies if they are
forced to class arbitrate, the majority never even discussed the
detailed findings in the Discover Bank case, namely that if
class action waivers are enforced in small damage consumer
cases, consumers will lose their rights while businesses,
because they can print their own “get-out-of-jail-free card,” will
make millions even if their behavior is demonstrably illegal. All
of this points to one-sided thinking that blinded the majority to
a litany of arguments that would have undermined its holding.
360 Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
361 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752.
362 Id. at 1751.
363 Id. at 1753.
364 Id. at 1744.
365 Id. at 1760-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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d. Strained Reasoning
There is little reasoning more strained than reaching a
decision that implicitly overrules decades of precedent without
even mentioning the relevant precedent or recognizing the
tension in the law. And it is certainly hard to square the
argument that the purpose of arbitration is to resolve disputes
efficiently with the majority’s decision, which essentially
assured that far fewer arbitrations will occur, and of those that
do, they will always resolve only one claim at a time.
e. Persistence
The dissent specifically asserted that the majority decision
would prevent consumers from pursuing their claims—a violation
of the vindication of rights doctrine and the fundamental purpose
of the FAA. The majority should have been persuaded, but
instead it implicitly asserted that the vindication of rights
doctrine did not matter. This was overt evidence that reason could
not change the majority’s mind, as it had already made a decision.
f.

Overconfidence

Completely failing to mention an entire body of law that
is precisely on point, and then refusing to do so even when
faced with it by the dissent, is extreme overconfidence.
The scorecard looks like this:
Confirmation Bias
Substitution
Creation of “my-side” arguments
Strained reasoning
Persistence
Overconfidence
IV.

X
X
X
X
X

WHAT IS THIS REALLY ALL ABOUT?

If by now you are convinced that the majority’s decisions
in Stolt and Concepcion are examples of the elephant leading
the rider, that is, examples of intuition rationalization at work,
then the only remaining question is what swayed the elephant.366

366

HAIDT, supra note 12, at 79-80.
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Some scholars have suggested the answer, implying
that it was the majority’s distaste for class actions and its
sympathy for businesses (really two sides of the same coin) that
drove the decision. For example, Alan Scott Rau wrote an article
that details the new limits on arbitrable power.367 In his article,
he notes that Scalia and the majority seem to have a “visceral”
response to class actions.368 He also remarks that businesses do
not include arbitration clauses because they like resolving
disputes or because they fear judicial review; instead, they
include them to avoid claim aggregation in which they could be
required to answer to multiple consumers.369 He suggests that
Justice Scalia was sympathetic to this goal, and points to
Scalia’s mention of “in terrorem” class actions—which Justice
Scalia suggests are class actions that force businesses to settle
what are essentially frivolous claims.370
In addition to pointing out this language in AT&T, Rau
notes how unusual the result in Stolt truly is.
One would have to invest a good deal of time and effort before being able
to identify cases – which in the end amount only to a trivial number – in
which the Supreme Court has been willing to mandate or approve the
annulment of an arbitral award. (And before now these have been
strictly outliers, grounded either on the lack of any agreement at all, or
on some impropriety in the composition of the arbitral tribunal). But
then we come to Stolt-Nielsen: It can hardly be accidental that the
specter of class relief in arbitration is just about the only feature of the
arbitration process that has been anathema to the business community
– or that this rare decision restrictive of arbitral power happens, wonder
of wonders, to be one in which a business-oriented court manages more
or less to relieve it of any such anxiety.371

Following up on this assertion, Rau also suggests that
“Stolt-Nielsen is in this sense entirely unprincipled” because
“avoidance of class relief is the engine driving the machine.”372
Rau has it right. The common threads in the opinions
are (1) a dislike for class actions and class arbitrations and (2)
a genuine concern for businesses and their well-being. And the
opinions do far more than express the majority’s feelings. The
decline of class actions saved, and will continue to save, businesses
millions of dollars per year, all at the expense of individual
367 See generally Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of Contract:
The New Trilogy, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 435 (2011).
368 Id. at 545-46.
369 Id. at 543.
370 Id.
371 Id. at 484-85.
372 Id. at 485.
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consumers.373 Stolt largely eliminates class arbitration and
Concepcion eviscerates many contract-based class actions,
including claims that might arise in any lending context or
employment setting. As a result, businesses can now include an
arbitration clause that prohibits class actions and be almost
certain it will be enforced. Businesses are immunized from
certain liabilities, even for crystal clear violations of the law.
Considering the real world results of Stolt and
Concepcion drives home the detrimental impact on class action
litigation. Because of these decisions, although many states
have cases and statutes recognizing that some class action
waivers are unconscionable, these laws cannot be enforced in
the arbitration context. The result is that an arbitration clause
is treated differently from other contract provision. This is a
legal absurdity that encourages businesses to pile their most
questionable provisions into arbitration clauses, where it seems
they will receive special treatment.
A shining example of this exists in a case I have worked on
for six years. In Brewer v. Missouri Title Loans, Plaintiff asserted
that Defendant was violating Missouri law relating to title
loans.374 Missouri Title Loan’s contract contained an arbitration
clause that prohibited class actions.375 Plaintiff conducted
discovery, hired experts, and proved to the trial court that the
class action waiver would create immunity for the defendant
because consumers could not find representation to bring
individual claims for only a few hundred or a few thousand
dollars.376 The defendant produced no contrary evidence.377 The
Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s holding that
the class action waiver was unconscionable.378 The Missouri
Supreme Court also noted that the clause was a de facto
exculpatory clause and failed under general Missouri law.379 The
result was clear: in Missouri, if there was evidence that a contract
provision would prevent a consumer from pursuing his or her

373 See John Campbell, Unprotected Class: Five Decisions, Five Justices, and
Wholesale Changes to Class Action Law, 13 WYO. L. REV. 463 (2013) (discussing how
decisions by the conservative majority of the United States Supreme Court have
dramatically reduced the number of class actions that can be pursued, even when the
activity is demonstrably illegal).
374 Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 488 (Mo. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 191 (2012).
375 Id. at 487.
376 Id. at 493-94.
377 Id. at 494.
378 Id. at 496.
379 Id. at 487-88.
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rights, then it was too one-sided—and thus unconscionable—to be
enforced.380
However, after Concepcion, the United States Supreme
Court vacated the decision.381 On remand, the Missouri
Supreme Court struck the arbitration clause because it
contained a number of other offensive provisions, but it did not
and could not rely upon the existence of the class action
waiver.382 Indeed, on the same day, the Missouri Supreme Court
was forced to remand a different case for further consideration
because the trial court had rested its finding of
unconscionability on the existence of a class action waiver.383
The result was that the case was remanded to the trial court
and was never pursued as a class action.
The result in Missouri is now clear. If a party presents
decisive evidence that a contract term prevents him from
pursing his legal rights, that term is unconscionable. This is
true for class action waivers in small damage cases. However,
despite the fact that this is general Missouri law, if the
business is clever enough to put the class action waiver under
the heading of “arbitration,” the clause magically becomes
enforceable. This holds true no matter how much evidence there
is that enforcing the clause will prevent the resolution of disputes.
While in private practice, my class action team alone passed on
dozens of cases in which we concluded that businesses were
acting unethically but that a class action wavier in an
arbitration clause would prevent us from pursuing the claim.
This included claims against businesses like payday
lenders, who in Missouri, charge over 400% interest on loans.384
This is a salient example of the need for class actions because,
prior to the errant decisions of the majority, two payday
lenders in Missouri were sued in class actions. They settled the
lawsuits for over $30 million in cash and debt relief to the
affected individuals.385 These lawsuits impacted about 200
payday loan stores, but there are roughly 1,000 payday lenders
in Missouri.386 It is an absolute certainty that more lawsuits
Id. at 493-95.
Mo. Title Loans, Inc. v. Brewer, 131 S. Ct. 2875 (2011).
382 Brewer, 364 S.W.3d at 490-91.
383 Robinson v. Title Lenders, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 505, 517 (Mo. 2012).
384 Letter from Richard J. Weaver, Comm’r of Fin., State of Mo., to Hon.
Jeremiah W. Nixon, Governor, State of Mo. (Feb. 7, 2013), available at http://finance.mo.gov/
Contribute%20Documents/2013PaydayLenderSurvey.pdf.
385 Hooper v. Advance America, 589 F.3d 917 (8th Cir. 2009); Woods v. QC
Fin. Servs., Inc., 280 S.W.3d 90 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008).
386 Letter from Richard Weaver, supra note 384.
380
381
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would have been filed to challenge the practices of the other
payday lenders, but Concepcion intervened, and in doing so
ensured that payday lenders could continue to engage in
questionable legal practices with no concern that they would ever
have to answer to all their customers. Further, no individuals
were likely to pursue claims because the payday loans were
only $500 or less.387
These results are not anomalous. A year after the
Supreme Court handed down Concepcion, Public Citizen, a
group that monitors a variety of constitutional and national
issues impacting citizens, wrote a report entitled Justice Denied,
in which it chronicled the impact Concepcion had on class
actions.388 The report concluded that “the decision provided
corporations with a tool to insulate themselves from facing
meaningful accountability for cheating large numbers of
consumers out of amounts too small to make pursuing individual
cases economically feasible.”389 The report used Westlaw’s KeyCite
function to identify 76 potential class actions that were
dismissed by courts who cited to Concepcion.390 And of course,
the report could not capture the hundreds of cases that were
not filed or were voluntarily dismissed for the same reason.
To further illustrate how the Concepcion immunity
blanket works, consider a hypothetical. A national cell phone
company with 20 million customers includes a class action
waiver in its arbitration clause in its contract with each
customer. That company could, tomorrow, add a $1
questionable fee to each customer’s bill. The fee would generate
roughly $20 million dollars in revenue the next month. If the
fee were illegal, each customer’s only choice would be to file an
arbitration action for $1 in damages. Under the majority’s
holdings in Stolt and Concepcion, there is simply no way to hold
this company accountable for all the potentially illegal gains. As a
result, a company is far more likely to test the boundaries of
illegality. If it gets it wrong and breaks the law, it is almost
certain to answer to no one. Even if a few zealots do file individual

Id.
Justice Denied: One Year Later: The Harms to Consumers from the
Supreme Court’s Concepcion Decision are Plainly Evident, PUB. CITIZEN & NAT’L ASS’N
CONSUMER ADVOCATES (April 2012), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
concepcion-anniversary-justice-denied-report.pdf.
389 Id. at 4.
390 Id.
387
388
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claims, the company’s gains still greatly exceed the money it pays
to settle claims—cheating becomes profitable business.391
These results are ironic. Because the majority
eliminated both class arbitration and class actions in many
contexts, and because this was accomplished by favoring
arbitration clauses that require individual arbitration,
arbitrations are less likely to happen, and the purpose of the
FAA has been eroded. Yet all of this occurred in the name of
the FAA. As a result, a statute designed to encourage the
resolution of disputes now stands as an obstacle to pursuing
the claims at all. Because of this, the prophecy of Discover
Bank is now entirely true:
Class action and arbitration waivers are not, in the abstract,
exculpatory clauses. But because, as discussed above, damages in
consumer cases are often small and because a company which
wrongfully exacts a dollar from each of millions of customers will
reap a handsome profit . . . the class action is often the only effective
way to halt and redress such exploitation.392

V.

MOVING FORWARD

The analysis above highlights the dangers of unchecked
IR. It suggests that decisions with wide-ranging implications
can be hijacked by IR without judges even knowing it. In the test
cases, the majority asserted, and probably believed, that it
reached an inevitable result driven by immutable reason. It was
blind to its own IR. And as discussed above, this led to Court
decisions that should immediately be overruled because they do
not display the legal reasoning one should demand from the
highest court in the United States and because they produce real
world results that are equally out of step with the law.
But this is not an article about reversing two court
cases. It is an article about the broader implications of IR. If IR
truly pops up most when strong emotions are present, then IR
can be expected to turn up in some of the most contentious and
important cases in the country. Debates over abortion, gun
rights, whether companies can give money to political
campaigns, whether companies can be held responsible for their
human rights behavior in other countries, the rights of

391 For more on the Court’s wholesale changes to class action law since 2010,
see Campbell, supra note 373.
392 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108-09 (Cal. 2005),
abrogated by AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
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homosexuals, and even who should be named President could all
be (and may have already been) compromised by IR.
What can be done? I see two initial steps. First, there is
already a great deal known about cognitive science and
decision making in particular. This field of inquiry needs to be
pointed out more precisely to the judiciary. Presently, although
there are increasing numbers of scholars studying how jurors
are impacted by a variety of cognition principles,393 I am aware
of few large scale studies to determine how judges reach their
conclusions. Parsing out the role IR already plays in decision
making, and doing this with some empirical rigor, would be a
significant advance.
But identifying what role IR is playing in decision
making is only a beginning. There are larger questions
implicated. Justice Scalia criticizes judges who ask, “Is this
decision good for the little guy?”394 But my analysis reveals that
Scalia asks similar questions, at least internally, such as, “Is this
decision good for big business?” Serious debate could and should
be had about what role emotion and moral value determinations
should play in decision making. In other words, is it necessary to
eliminate emotion, or is it simply necessary to overtly name it
when it plays a role? After all, if deeply held beliefs will, at least
in some cases, play a role even when unacknowledged, it may be
that transparent discussion of these beliefs is the better course.
The question above will be informed by yet another
query. Can IR be eliminated? Can people be taught to avoid it?
There is already some literature on this, but I know of none in
the judicial realm. Controlled studies in which people are
educated about IR, then asked to engage in cognitive tasks,
could reveal how much IR can be tamed. These studies could
prove especially interesting if applied to judges. Imagine
educating judges about IR, then asking them to review their
own past decisions
At a minimum, cognitive science should have a seat at the
table in judicial training programs. Judges are in the business of
making decisions; they should be acutely aware of the cognition
challenges that all people face when doing so. If this education
occurs, could judges identify IR in their own decisions? Would
they recognize a need for peer input to at least curb the influence
393 See, e.g., Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
174, 176 (2010). Bernard Chao, a colleague of mine, Christopher Robertson, and I are
also working on an article that will study the anchor effect on jury verdicts.
394 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 35, at 18.
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of their own feelings? These are unanswered questions that
demand answers.
My intuition (and I recognize the irony) is that
education about IR is like what many defenders used to say
about Michael Jordan. “You can’t stop him, you can only hope to
contain him.” We cannot eliminate cognitive errors, especially in
the fast-flow of everyday life. But, in judicial opinions—which can
be considered and revised—we can hope to reduce IR’s influence
by making it more transparent. This would produce more
consistent judicial opinions, reduce the risk that opinions are
driven by quiet undercurrents, and, in all, be more consistent
with the common law tradition.
CONCLUSION
IR abounds. We all engage in it, and this includes the
conservative majority. These are important truths. Many have
lambasted the conservative majority for business-friendly
decisions, but more is needed. Beyond conservative or liberal
viewpoints, we must understand what drives judicial decision
making. We must ask why and how?
IR is most likely to appear when deeply held beliefs are
at issue, and that has serious implications for the work of
judges, whether they sit in trial courts or on the Supreme
Court. An analysis of Stolt and Concepcion reveals that IR
binds and blinds, bringing those with like views together and
then preventing them from seeing their own logical fallacies. In
doing so, it lets the elephant run amok, reducing the rider to a
post hoc justifier. As discussed, this can have real world
consequences of immense proportions.
The solution is to study the IR undercurrent, to educate
those who are most impacted by it, and hopefully in doing so, to
heed the advice of Justice Sonia Sotomayor. It is only by knowing
and understanding when “personal bias is seeping in to our
decision-making” that we can hope to be “fair and impartial.”395
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